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Recent evidence suggests that women may be underrepresented in fields said to require 
high levels of intellectual ability (“brilliance”). These fields may be unwelcoming to women 
because of a pervasive “brilliance = men” stereotype. This hypothesis is termed the Field-
specific Ability Beliefs (or FAB) Hypothesis (e.g., Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2017; Storage et al., 
2016). While a wealth of evidence has established a link between the presence of beliefs about 
the importance of brilliance and women’s underrepresentation in a field, less work has been done 
to document the “brilliance = men” stereotype. The aim of the present work, then, was to provide 
evidence that people tend to associate intellectual giftedness with men over women. Across six 
studies (total N = 1,675), I devised systematic tests of people’s implicit biases about the 
brilliance of men vs. women, and found that children ages 9 and 10, undergraduates from the 
University of Illinois and New York University, general population adults from across the United 
States, and adults from 70 countries beyond the United States all tended to associate traits such 
as “genius” and “brilliant”—as well as less extreme descriptors, such as “intelligent” and 
“smart”—with men over women. Together, the results reveal a pervasive stereotype that 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The underrepresentation of women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) fields has been a strong focus of research and policymaking in recent years. As a prime 
example of this problem, a 2016 survey conducted by the National Science Foundation found 
that women earn less than 19% of PhDs in computer science and physics, and are in general 
earning fewer PhDs than men on average in STEM fields (NSF, 2016). While the spotlight on 
STEM fields is certainly warranted, an overemphasis on STEM fields alone may conceal a more 
nuanced pattern of representation. Data from this same survey show that some fields within 
STEM, such as neuroscience and cell biology, have equal proportions of men and women 
earning degrees. Looking beyond STEM—at the social science and humanities fields—one finds 
a similar distribution of representation statistics. While some fields (e.g., psychology) do not 
suffer from issues of representation, women in fields such as philosophy, economics, and music 
theory are earning fewer than 35% of degrees (NSF, 2016). Given these statistics, the question 
shifts from why women are underrepresented in STEM to what factors can explain women’s 
representation in select fields across the academic spectrum (both STEM and non-STEM). In 
what follows, I (1) review the evidence for several accounts that have attempted to provide an 
explanation for women’s underrepresentation, (2) review the evidence for a recent, parsimonious 
explanation for women’s representation both in and beyond STEM, and (3) provide evidence for 
a key component of this explanation.  
Explanations for Women’s Underrepresentation  
Two broad theoretical perspectives have been proposed to address the problem of 
women’s underrepresentation. According to one perspective, the underrepresentation of women 
is caused by biological factors. Specifically, researchers who adopt this perspective hypothesize 
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that there are innate differences that exist between men and women, and that these differences 
inevitably lead members of these two groups to choose diverging career paths. Other researchers, 
however, believe this problem to be caused by sociocultural factors. These researchers posit that 
innate differences between men and women (e.g., in ability) are either minimal or entirely 
nonexistent, and that any differences in career choices made later on in life are the result of 
socialization.  
Below, I begin with a discussion of the biological accounts that have been proposed in an 
attempt to explain women’s underrepresentation. The bulk of biologically based accounts found 
in the literature on this topic can fit into one of four categories. First, some argue that 
underrepresentation is caused primarily by innate differences in ability (e.g., Benbow & 
Lubinski, 1997). According to proponents of this hypothesis, innate gender differences in, for 
example, mathematical and spatial reasoning contribute to women’s underrepresentation later on 
in life. Second, other researchers believe that this problem is caused by innate differences in 
variability (e.g., Geary, 1998; Johnson, Carothers, & Deary, 2008; Wai et al., 2010). According 
to these researchers, men on average tend to be more variable in key dimensions (e.g., 
mathematics reasoning), leading to more men on both the lower and, more importantly for the 
present discussion, the higher ends of the distribution of mathematics ability. When looking to 
admit top-level candidates into PhD programs, then, search committees may (as a result of these 
differences in variability) find more qualified men than women, leading to an 
underrepresentation of women in these fields. Third, some researchers have proposed innate 
gender differences in cognitive styles (i.e., ways of thinking), which contribute to the 
underrepresentation of women in certain sectors of academia (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2007). According to these authors, men and women 
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naturally differ in the extent to which they prefer to think abstractly about systems versus the 
extent to which they prefer to think about emotions and people. These natural differences lead to 
differential career choices according to the strengths of these two cognitive styles. Finally, a 
group of scholars have argued that the underrepresentation of women in academia is caused 
primarily by differences in preferences (e.g., Ferriman, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009; Hakim, 
2006; Summers, 2005; Williams & Ceci, 2012). These researchers believe that men place higher 
value on high-powered careers whereas women prefer to focus on home life, naturally leading to 
differences in career choices. In the sections below, I provide detailed descriptions of each of 
these accounts and briefly review the evidence that their proponents have put forth before turning 
to a key sociocultural account that will be the main focus of this paper.  
Innate differences in ability. As mentioned briefly above, several authors have argued 
for innate gender differences in ability as a key explanation for women’s underrepresentation 
(e.g., Benbow & Lubinski, 1997). Proponents of this hypothesis tend to interpret documented 
gender differences in mathematical reasoning and spatial reasoning—skills that are important for 
success in many of the fields in which women are currently underrepresented—as biologically-
rooted causes for differential representation. In one large-scale study of gender differences in 
mathematical ability, Hyde et al. (1990) performed a meta-analysis of 100 studies with a total of 
over 3 million participants. The results of this meta-analysis showed a very slight advantage for 
boys over girls in mathematics problem solving, particularly in high-school age participants (i.e., 
around the time when adolescents are making important decisions about whether to pursue 
college and, critically, what fields they may want to major in). In another study, longitudinal data 
was collected from a large sample of children from kindergarten to 8th grade (Robinson & 
Lubienski, 2011). Overall, a gender difference in mathematical ability favoring boys emerged 
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over time. It seems reasonable to conclude that, if girls perceive themselves to be less adept than 
boys in mathematics, they may be discouraged moving forward from pursuing fields that require 
mathematical prowess (e.g., mathematics, physics). Importantly, however, it should be noted that 
no gender differences in male vs. female students’ mathematical ability were found in earlier 
grades (e.g., kindergarten), perhaps casting doubt on the idea that the differences found later on 
are due to innate, biological causes rather than sociocultural ones. 
The idea that men and women possess natural differences in ability is not specific to 
mathematics, however. Research has also focused on another ability on which men and women 
differ: spatial reasoning. Spatial reasoning has been proposed as an important predictor of 
entrance into STEM fields because scientific phenomena often involve spatial problems (e.g., 
Gagnier & Fisher, 2016). In one study, for example, Wai et al. (2009) collected a large sample of 
high school students and tracked them longitudinally for over a decade. Critically, the 
researchers found that spatial ability in high school was a significant predictor of the tendency to 
pursue careers in STEM later on in life. In another study, Kell et al. (2013) assessed the spatial 
ability of 563 intellectually gifted 13-year-olds. After 30 years, the authors found that spatial 
ability scores uniquely predicted creativity (as defined by accumulated patents and publications), 
which we would expect to facilitate success in scientific pursuits. Researchers have proposed that 
males possess superior spatial reasoning ability (e.g., Dabbs, Chang, Strong, & Milun, 1998), 
and evidence from 4- and 5-month-olds point to the possibility of this pattern being innate 
(Moore & Johnson, 2008; Quinn & Liben, 2008). If such differences in both spatial reasoning 
and mathematical ability exist and are biologically rooted, it again seems reasonable to predict 
that such differences may account at least in part for women’s underrepresentation (particularly 
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in STEM fields; the applicability of this proposal to women’s underrepresentation in social 
science and humanities fields is arguably more limited). 
Innate differences in variability. While some researchers have proposed that innate 
gender differences in ability are a potential explanation for women’s underrepresentation, others 
have chosen to focus instead on innate gender differences in variability. Proponents of the 
hypothesis that innate differences in variability contribute to women’s underrepresentation argue 
that mean differences in (mathematical and spatial reasoning) ability are generally either small or 
entirely nonexistent, whereas differences in variability between men and women along these 
dimensions do exist. In one influential study, for example, Hedges and Nowell (1995) analyzed 
mental test scores from multiple national studies and found that mean ability differences between 
men and women were very small and remained stable across time. In most areas, however, 
differences were found in the variability of the data, such that men yielded consistently more 
variable distributions of scores than women. With the exception of perceptual speed, associative 
memory, and reading comprehension, men consistently and significantly outnumbered women at 
the upper tails of the distribution of scores. Similarly, Johnson, Carothers, and Deary (2008) 
argue that although mean differences in the intelligence of men versus women are virtually 
nonexistent, there tend to be more men at both the upper and lower tails of the distribution of 
intelligence. In this study, population-level data from 11-year-olds in Scotland was analyzed and, 
consistent with the proposal that there are innate differences in variability, boys were found to be 
more variable than girls in their general intelligence (again yielding greater numbers of boys at 
both the lower and, more importantly, upper levels of intellectual ability). In a similar vein, Wai 
et al. (2010) calculated male-to-female ratios from nearly 2 million 7th grade children in the top 
5% of the distribution of intelligence (as measured by ability in multiple domains, including 
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ability in mathematics, verbal reasoning, and writing). It was found that, despite overall smaller 
male-to-female ratios than 30 years ago (indicating less of an advantage for boys over girls), an 
advantage for boys in mathematics ability at the upper tail of the distribution has persisted and 
remained stable over the last 20 years.  
It is important to note, however, that these tail discrepancies differ both by region within 
the United States (e.g., Pope & Snydor, 2008) and by country, such that gender differences are 
less pronounced in more gender-egalitarian countries (e.g., Penner, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008). If 
these differences vary by culture, it becomes more plausible to predict that they are caused by 
sociocultural factors rather than biological ones. Further, the innate differences in variability that 
have been proposed in the literature do not always favor men. In the study described above, for 
example, Wai et al. (2010) found that women outscored men significantly in the upper tail of the 
distribution of verbal and writing ability, a finding generally consistent with prior literature 
showing an advantage for women over men in these domains (see Halpern & LaMay, 2000, for a 
review). Regardless, this proposal has implications for the tendency of men versus women to 
pursue careers in STEM domains in particular, which tend to prize mathematical and spatial 
ability more than verbal and writing ability (despite the fact that each of these abilities is 
important for success in these fields).  
Biologically rooted greater male variability in these domains, assuming for a moment that 
this is in fact the case, poses a problem for women attempting to pursue careers in STEM. To 
illustrate the problem, imagine a normal distribution of data versus Student’s t distribution. Data 
that follow Student’s t distribution tend to have longer tails that extend further out than the 
normal distribution, reflecting greater variability. If we were to superimpose Student’s t 
distribution on top of a normal distribution, the tails of the normal distribution would drop off 
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while the tails of Student’s t distribution would extend farther out. By analogy and in accordance 
with the innate differences in variability proposal, we could characterize the distribution of 
women’s ability in mathematics as a normal distribution and the distribution of men’s ability in 
mathematics as a Student’s t distribution. If we were to superimpose the “men–Student’s t” 
distribution on top of the “women–normal” distribution, we would almost exclusively find men 
at both the upper and lower ends of the spectrum of mathematical ability. If, then, a search 
committee from a prestigious university were looking to admit top-tier applicants into their 
program, they would be more likely to find men than women in the top, e.g., 1% of applications. 
Such a disparity would lead to underrepresentation of women in these domains.  
Innate differences in cognitive styles. As briefly reviewed above, a wealth of research 
has been devoted to measuring whether differences in ability and variability exist between men 
and women. Other researchers that subscribe to the biological perspective, however, have instead 
proposed that there exist innate differences in the cognitive styles of the two genders. According 
to the proponents of such accounts, the problem of women’s underrepresentation is not 
specifically or entirely that men are superior to women in mathematical ability, for example, but 
rather that men and women have different styles of thinking that influence their career 
aspirations and choices in different ways.  
The main biological account regarding innate differences in cognitive styles was first 
proposed by Baron-Cohen in 2002. According to this account, men and women naturally differ 
in the extent to which they prefer to think about—and excel at thinking about—systems versus 
emotions. Baron-Cohen (2002) proposed that men tend to have “systemizing” brains, 
characterized by the ability to think abstractly and systematically. As such, men may be better 
equipped to learn about domains that benefit from thinking abstractly and systematically. For 
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example, it might be the case that having “systemizing” minds gives men an advantage when it 
comes to analyzing and making predictions about objects (perhaps underlying the gender 
differences in spatial ability reviewed above). In contrast, Baron-Cohen suggests that women 
tend to have “empathizing” minds, characterized by an innate penchant for thinking about 
people’s mental states and emotions and appropriately responding to those mental states and 
emotions. As a result, it might be the case that having “empathizing” minds may give women an 
advantage when it comes to pursuing careers in fields that value the ability to interact and deal 
with others.  
These supposed innate differences in cognitive styles, then, pose a problem for women in 
STEM: Having a “systemizing” mind seems to provide an advantage in the STEM domain, 
whereas having an “empathizing” mind may prove advantageous in several non-STEM fields. 
Evidence for these ideas comes primarily from a study conducted by Billington, Baron-Cohen, 
and Wheelwright (2007). In this study, 415 students in both STEM and non-STEM (specifically, 
humanities) fields were asked to complete a measure of systemizing versus empathizing. Results 
showed significant gender differences in the extent to which students reported being 
“systemizing” thinkers versus “empathizing” thinkers, such that, as predicted by the study’s 
authors, men scored significantly higher on the “systemizing” dimension whereas women scored 
significantly higher on the “empathizing” dimension, effectively replicating the results of Baron-
Cohen’s (2002) original study. Moreover, and important to the discussion of women’s 
underrepresentation in STEM, it was found that students in the physical sciences scored 
significantly higher on the “systemizing” dimension and significantly lower on the 
“empathizing” dimension as compared to students in the humanities. Although this was the case 
irrespective of the participants’ gender, underrepresentation may be a natural byproduct of men 
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being overall better “systemizers.” According to the authors, then, men tend to be better 
“systemizing” thinkers, and this tendency uniquely predicts entrance into the physical sciences 
(leading to more men in STEM).  
Innate differences in preferences. A final category of biologically based accounts 
seeking to explain women’s underrepresentation proposes that men and women naturally differ 
in their preferences, and that their different preferences lead them to pursue different sorts of 
careers later on in life (e.g., Ceci & Williams, 2011; Hakim, 2006; Ferriman, Lubinski, & 
Benbow, 2009; Summers, 2005; Williams & Ceci, 2012). According to proponents of this idea, it 
is not innate differences in cognitive ability, variability, or style that lead men and women to 
pursue different sorts of fields (i.e., STEM versus non-STEM fields), but rather it is biologically-
rooted differences in preferences and priorities that lead to such differences later on in life. In 
particular, researchers have proposed that women prefer a family-centered lifestyle whereas men 
prefer a work-centered lifestyle. Whereas women place a higher priority on spending time with 
friends and loved ones, ensuring a stable home environment, and childrearing, men place a 
higher priority on being successful at work and ensuring that they can provide for the family 
(e.g., Ceci & Williams, 2011). These different preferences and priorities naturally lend 
themselves, then, to different occupations. Work-centered men who are happy to work long 
hours in isolation should excel in high-powered STEM careers, whereas family-centered women 
who may not be willing to devote so much time to their career at the expense of their family may 
wish to choose a different career path. This phenomenon may thus lead to an underrepresentation 
of women in STEM domains over time.  
To assess the extent to which gender differences in preferences and priorities lead to the 
underrepresentation of women (particularly in STEM), Ferriman, Lubinski, and Benbow (2009) 
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measured the work preferences, personal views, and life values of top-tier graduate students in 
math and science. At both 25 and 35 years of age, men were found to be more career-focused 
than women, placing a higher priority on producing high-impact work, making more money, and 
becoming leaders in their fields. In contrast, women in both age groups placed a higher priority 
on community, family, and friendships, at the expense of their career. These gender differences 
perhaps unsurprisingly intensified upon the transition to parenthood, a change driven primarily 
by mothers. Along similar lines, Hakim (2006) argues that, while there exist no differences 
between the cognitive ability of men and women, gender differences in work preferences and 
priorities exist and persist over time. Specifically, Hakim argues that men and women differ in 
their competitiveness (with men being more competitive), life goals (with men’s goals being 
centered around career and women’s goals being centered around family), and the emphasis on 
agency versus connection (with men preferring agency and independence and women preferring 
connection and community). Such differences, then, may lead to differential career aspirations: 
Competitive, agentic men with strong career aspirations may choose to pursue high-impact 
careers in STEM, whereas women who are naturally more concerned with family and 
community may cede “occupational power” to men in favor of jobs with fewer work hours and a 
more flexible schedule. Consistent with this possibility, Lubinski et al. (2001) found that male 
graduate students are less concerned about the flexibility of job opportunities than are their 
female counterparts, presumably because the men are happy to spend more time on their career, 
whereas women have other goals. 
Evaluating biological perspectives. The evidence presented above seems to support 
biologically based accounts regarding women’s underrepresentation. At the same time, there are 
several reasons to doubt that the biological perspective presents an accurate and complete 
11 
 
explanation for gender disparities in representation. One limitation of these explanations, for 
example, is that they tend to focus solely on women’s underrepresentation in STEM fields while 
failing to account for why women are also underrepresented in many non-STEM fields. Putting 
this issue aside, there remains at the broadest level one flaw in the logic of all four of the 
biological accounts reviewed above: The evidence that differences between men and women in 
ability, variability, cognitive styles, and preferences are actually innate is either rare or 
nonexistent.  
I began, for example, with a review of the evidence in support of the idea that there exist 
innate differences in men’s versus women’s mathematics ability. Hyde et al.’s (1990) article is 
often cited as evidence for this account. However, this study provides no evidence that the 
differences reviewed are biologically rooted and innate. In fact, the study reported that gender 
differences in mathematical ability emerged later on in life and were virtually absent in early 
childhood. Similarly, as foreshadowed above, Robinson and Lubienski (2011) reported gender 
differences in mathematics achievement in elementary school, but not in kindergarten. As a 
result, it is entirely plausible that the gender differences in mathematics ability are not 
biologically based, but are rather the result of socialization over time. In line with this possibility, 
much evidence has been presented in favor of the idea that gender differences in mathematics 
proficiency and success are caused by sociocultural—rather than biological—factors. Recently, 
for example, Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, and Levine (2010) conducted a study of the 
relationship between elementary school teachers’ and students’ math anxiety over time. 
Specifically, the researchers asked 1st and 2nd grade teachers (90% of whom are women in the 
United States) to complete measures of math anxiety at the beginning of the school year, and 
also assessed the math achievement of their respective students at both the beginning and the end 
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of the school year. Results showed that, although there was no relationship between teachers’ 
and students’ math anxiety at the beginning of the school year, a relationship emerged by the end 
of the school year. Specifically, a significant positive correlation was found at the end of the 
school year between female teachers’ math anxiety and girls’—but not boys’—math anxiety. In 
other words, it appears that female teachers tend to pass on their math anxiety to their female, but 
not their male, students. Because math anxiety has clear implications for math interest, 
performance, and ultimately success, it seems that socialization (via teachers, in this case) is a 
viable explanation for gender differences in mathematics ability.  
Similarly, Gunderson, Ramirez, and Levine (2012) review pertinent evidence that girls 
tend to have higher rates of math anxiety (perhaps transmitted by mothers and female teachers, 
as discussed above), and that these attitudes affect math performance. Moreover, as a result of 
both increased math anxiety and impaired math performance, women tend to avoid pursuing 
math-related careers as compared to men, who do not face these obstacles. Again, the question 
arises—are these differences in math anxiety and performance biologically rooted, or are they 
the result of socialization? The evidence favors the latter. Gunderson et al. (2012) review a 
wealth of evidence, for example, which shows that both parents and teachers expect their male 
children and students to have greater ability in mathematics than their female counterparts. It 
may not be the case, then, that innate gender disparities in mathematics ability exist, but rather 
that, from an early age, adults treat boys and girls differently. By imposing their own implicit 
biases and beliefs on the next generation, parents and teachers may inadvertently be discouraging 
girls from pursuing mathematics in the long term. If girls grow up knowing that their own 
parents view them as less capable in mathematics than boys, this may cause them to disengage 
from mathematics and underperform.  
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This conclusion—that the biological accounts have no strong evidence that the proposed 
gender differences are in fact biological—holds for the other three categories of proposals as 
well. Take, for example, the proposal that men’s brains naturally “systemize,” whereas women’s 
brains naturally “empathize.” Although Baron-Cohen and his colleagues argue that the reliable 
differences between men and women in “systemizing” and “empathizing” are biologically 
rooted, the evidence for this claim is not convincing. While there has been some infant research 
showing that boys are more likely to focus on objects whereas girls are more likely to focus on 
people (e.g., Connellan et al., 2000; Lutchmaya & Baron-Cohen, 2002), the results of larger 
studies do not support this finding (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; see Spelke, 2005, for a 
critical review). Thus, it seems just as reasonable to assume that such differences are the result of 
many years of differential socialization. Parents—and society in general—treat children 
differently as a function of their gender, and do so from a very young age. While their babies are 
still in the womb, many parents begin to paint the baby’s room pink or blue, and already have a 
range of gendered toys prepared for the infant. In one study, for example, Wood et al. (2002) 
show that parents tend to provide children with toys that are stereotypically gendered. Providing 
young boys with blocks may promote an interest and ability in the kind of abstract, systematic 
thinking characteristic of a “systemizing” mind. At the same time, providing young girls with 
Barbie dolls and plastic babies to take care of may encourage them to think more of family, 
community, and emotions, a pattern characteristic of the “empathizing” mind. It should be easy 
to see how, over time, such socialization processes would lead to differences in the way that men 
versus women think, perhaps leading to differential career decisions. This sort of early 
socialization can also explain differences in spatial reasoning. Providing boys with blocks may 
give them an advantage over time in object-centered reasoning, improving their ability in 
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domains that rely on this type of reasoning. Similarly, providing Barbie and baby dolls to girls 
(versus blocks and trucks to boys) may lead to differences in preferences, priorities, and goals 
later on in life. If girls are raised with the understanding that they, as opposed to boys, are the 
ones who should focus on childrearing, this may lead to a more family-centered (versus work-
centered) orientation later in life. Despite the preceding examples being all about toys, the idea 
should hold more generally: Many of the phenomena that are assumed to be biologically rooted 
could just as easily be explained by socialization.  
To summarize, there does not appear to be convincing evidence to suggest that men and 
women differ biologically in ways that could affect their success or interest in different careers. 
Instead, it seems more plausible to assume that gender differences (in ability, interest, etc.) are 
caused by socialization rather than biology. Shifting our attention, then, from biological causes to 
sociocultural ones may prove more fruitful in attempting to further understand the current 
problem of representation in academia.  
A promising sociocultural account: The FAB Hypothesis. As discussed above, 
biological explanations do not seem to adequately account for the underrepresentation of women 
across the range of STEM and especially non-STEM fields where gender gaps exist. I now go on 
to review evidence for a promising sociocultural account regarding women’s underrepresentation 
that has, in recent years, been gaining significant empirical support and that may provide a more 
satisfactory explanation (e.g., Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2015; Meyer, Cimpian, & Leslie, 2015; 
Storage et al., 2016; for a review, see Cimpian & Leslie, 2017).  
Anecdotally, fields vary in the extent to which they prize various traits as necessary for 
success. Some fields, for example, have practitioners who emphasize effort as necessary for 
success, whereas practitioners of other fields believe largely that natural intellectual giftedness is 
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required for success in their field. These “field-specific ability beliefs” shape the atmosphere and 
culture of a field, and communicate either implicitly or explicitly what is valued in that field 
(Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2015). Importantly, such field-level beliefs can give rise to biases that 
may result in an underrepresentation of women under certain circumstances. “Brilliance-
required” fields—whose practitioners hold the belief that raw, natural talent is necessary for 
success—may discourage members of any group who are stereotyped as lacking such talent. 
Specifically, field-level beliefs about the importance of “brilliance” and “genius” as necessary 
for success might lower women’s representation in such fields because, in our culture, women 
are often stereotyped as lacking such abilities (e.g., Bennett, 1996, 1997; Kirkcaldy et al., 2007; 
Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014; Storage et al., 2016; Tiedemann, 2000; Upson & Friedman, 2012). 
To summarize, it is possible that (1) a field’s belief that raw intellectual talent is necessary for 
success, combined with (2) a cultural stereotype that women fail to possess this natural “gift” 
leads to underrepresentation of women in that field (Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2015; Meyer, 
Cimpian, & Leslie, 2015; Storage et al., 2016). This proposal is termed the Field-specific Ability 
Belief (or FAB) Hypothesis.   
Inspiration for this hypothesis came from decades of research that have documented 
individual-level (vs. field-level) differences in beliefs about what is required for success. Such 
beliefs have been categorized into one of two “mindsets” (e.g., Dweck 1999, 2006). At one end 
of the spectrum lies a belief that hard work, determination, and other controllable factors are 
largely most important in determining whether or not someone will succeed or fail. Dweck 
termed this orientation a “growth” (or “incremental”) mindset. At the other end of the spectrum 
lies a greater focus on uncontrollable factors as necessary for success: To be successful, one 
needs to possess some raw, innate talent. We call this orientation, which is akin to the 
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“brilliance-required” fields described above, a “fixed” (or “entity”) mindset. These individual-
level mindsets have been shown throughout numerous studies to relate to various aspects of 
achievement and motivation (e.g., Dweck 1999, 2006; Dweck & Leggett, 1998; Elliot & Dweck, 
1998; Yeager et al., 2013). People with fixed mindsets, for example, tend to avoid challenges and 
respond more negatively after failing at a challenging task. For these people, failing at a task is 
taken as a sign that they simply do not have what it takes to succeed; they have a certain amount 
of natural ability in an area, and that ability was insufficient to achieve success. This leads to an 
increase in negative affect and a decrease in interest in the activity at hand (e.g., Dweck 1999, 
2006; Yeager et al., 2013). In contrast, people with growth mindsets see challenging activities as 
an opportunity to, as the name suggests, grow. Failures are not reflective of a lack of innate 
ability, but rather are reflective of a need for greater effort and perhaps a change in strategies. As 
a result, people with growth mindsets are more likely to engage with challenging tasks, and 
experience less negative affect after a failure than people with a fixed mindset. Overall, this leads 
to greater motivation and achievement in the long term. Importantly, the mindsets one perceives 
in a classroom, department, and workplace can also greatly influence that person’s motivation, 
achievement, and goals (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Good, Rattan, & Dweck, 2012). If individual-
level beliefs about what is required for success can so greatly impact a person’s motivation, 
achievement, and goals, then field-level beliefs about what is required for success may also 
prove influential.  
Initial evidence for the FAB Hypothesis came from a nationwide survey of over 1,800 
academics from 12 STEM fields and 18 non-STEM fields (Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2015). In this 
survey, graduate students, postdoctoral students, and professors from a variety of fields were 
asked to indicate their beliefs (as well as their guesses about their colleagues’ beliefs) about what 
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is required for success in their respective field (e.g., “Being a top scholar of [discipline] requires 
a special aptitude that just can’t be taught”). This simple measure was found to significantly 
predict the representation of women (and other stereotyped groups, such as African Americans) 
across the academic spectrum. Meyer, Cimpian, and Leslie (2015) provided additional evidence 
for the FAB Hypothesis by turning to the general population (rather than professionals in 
academia). Specifically, they questioned participants from a variety of educational and 
geographical backgrounds online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participant-recruitment 
platform. Results showed that participants’ beliefs about what is required for success in a variety 
of STEM and non-STEM fields significantly predicted the representation of women in those 
fields, such that fields believed to require “brilliance” and “genius” tended to have fewer women.   
A final source of evidence for the FAB Hypothesis finds a relationship between ability 
beliefs and women’s representation in an arguably more naturalistic way. Rather than directly 
asking participants about what is necessary for success in a field, Storage et al. (2016) measured 
field-by-field variability in the extent to which brilliance is prized by tallying the number of 
times the words “brilliant” and “genius” were used in over 14 million reviews on the popular 
teacher-evaluation website RateMyProfessors.com. Fields with overall greater uses of these 
terms likely prize these traits and use them routinely to evaluate their members, making this 
language-based measure a naturalistic proxy for a field’s emphasis on intellectual prowess for 
success. As predicted by the FAB Hypothesis, a significant association was found between the 
number of times “brilliant” and “genius” were used in a field and the proportion of women (and 
African Americans) earning PhDs in that field, such that fields with more frequent uses of these 
words tended to have significantly fewer women (and African Americans). This finding, in 
addition to those of Leslie, Cimpian et al. (2015) and Meyer et al. (2015), illustrates a reliable 
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association between field-level beliefs about what is required for success and women’s 
representation both in and beyond STEM, providing strong support for the FAB Hypothesis.  
A key component of the FAB Hypothesis that still needs to be substantiated, however, is 
the stereotype against women’s intellectual abilities. Without such a stereotype, there is no 
reason to believe that field-level beliefs emphasizing the importance of intellectual prowess 
would put women at a disadvantage. In the following section, I (1) describe the prior evidence 
that such a stereotype exists, and (2) motivate the need for more systematic investigation of the 
stereotype (the main purpose of the present studies).  
A “Brilliance = Men” Stereotype  
The FAB Hypothesis posits that field-level beliefs about the necessity of “brilliance” 
combine with a “brilliance = men” stereotype to reduce women’s participation. There is 
relatively little prior research on this broad stereotype regarding intellectual ability—the bulk of 
prior research on gender stereotypes has instead been devoted to investigating stereotypes about 
specific cognitive abilities such as mathematics and spatial reasoning (e.g., Cvencek, Meltzoff, & 
Greenwald, 2011; Dabbs, Chang, Strong, & Milun, 1998; Eccles, Jacobs, & Harold, 1990; 
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002b; Reilly & Neumann, 2013; Spencer & Steele, 1991; 
Tomasetto, Alparone, & Cadinu, 2011). Below, I review the existing research on this topic and 
then motivate the need for additional investigations of the “brilliance = men” stereotype.  
Initial evidence for a “brilliance = men” stereotype. Although limited, initial evidence 
from a variety of sources suggests that a “brilliance = men” stereotype may be present in our 
society. Consider, for example, Google searches made by parents. One article in the New York 
Times reported that parents are significantly more likely to Google phrases such as “is my son a 
genius [intelligent, gifted]” than “is my daughter a genius [intelligent, gifted]” (Stephens-
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Davidowitz, 2014). In contrast, parents were much more likely to Google questions about their 
daughters’—rather than their sons’—appearance. If girls grow up with even an implicit 
awareness that their own parents view them as less intelligent than boys, this could have 
downstream consequences for their professional aspirations.  
Additional evidence for a stereotype against women’s brilliance comes from Storage et 
al.’s (2016) research on the frequency of the words “brilliant” and “genius” used to describe 
instructors on RateMyProfessors.com. Strikingly, the words “brilliant” and “genius” were used 
significantly more often to describe men than women across all academic fields for which data 
was available, and in no field were women described more often as “brilliant” or “genius” than 
men. The words “excellent” and “amazing,” however, were not used differentially on the basis of 
instructors’ genders. These results point not to an overall bias against women, but rather to a bias 
specific to women’s intellectual giftedness—female instructors are great, but they simply are not 
as brilliant as male instructors (according to their students).  
Other studies using more direct measures have produced results in line with the idea that 
men in today’s society are viewed as more intellectually gifted than women. Kirkcaldy et al. 
(2007), for example, found that fathers overestimate their intelligence as compared to mothers. 
Similarly, Furnham et al. (2002) found that parents estimated their sons’ intelligence as higher 
than their daughters’, and adult participants in another study rated their fathers’ intelligence as 
higher than their mothers’ (Bennett, 1996). Tiedemann (2000) also showed that elementary 
school teachers rated boys as better thinkers than girls, even when girls actually performed better 
than the boys. These findings are disheartening not only because of the negative impact the 
stereotype against women’s intelligence has on our society, but also because the stereotype is 
simply not accurate. Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that men and women have 
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equal levels of intelligence (e.g., Feingold, 1994; Flynn, 2012; Halpern & LaMay, 2000; Hyde, 
2005; Neisser, et al., 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012; Spelke, 2005).  
The need for further investigation of a “brilliance = men” stereotype. Although 
informative, prior investigations of the “brilliance = men” stereotype are limited in at least four 
critical ways. First, several of the studies reviewed above ask participants explicitly about their 
own intelligence (e.g., Kirkcaldy et al., 2007). Although this may seem like a reasonable starting 
place, asking participants to rate their own intelligence may superficially maximize differences 
between confident, overestimating men, and modest, underestimating women. In line with this 
possibility, a variety of studies illustrate that women tend to be significantly more modest than 
men when engaging in self-evaluation (e.g., Berg et al., 1981; Gould & Slone, 1982; Phillips, 
1987). Secondly, such explicit measures also face social desirability concerns, since people may 
not be willing to admit to holding negative stereotypes. Such concerns would, again, make it 
difficult to accurately assess the magnitude of the “brilliance = men” stereotype. A third issue 
concerns the fact that these studies were performed a while ago (e.g., Bennett, 1996; Furnham et 
al., 2002; Tiedemann, 2000), which suggests that a more up-to-date investigation of the 
stereotype may be in order. Finally, a fourth limitation of prior work is that these studies only 
contain adult populations. Investigating the developmental trajectory of the “brilliance = men” 
stereotype may prove invaluable in understanding when the stereotype arises and when we may 
be able to intervene. Given these limitations, systematic investigation of the “brilliance = men” 
stereotype is required. Specifically, we need a direct test of the stereotype using an implicit 
measure of bias (since people may not be willing to admit to—or may perhaps not be aware of—
holding negative stereotypes such as this). To meet this need, we turned in the present studies to 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
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The Implicit Association Test 
 The Implicit Association Test, originally developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and 
Schwartz in 1998, is a widely used computer-based sorting task designed to measure implicit 
biases. In a typical IAT, participants’ reaction times are measured as they sort images or words 
into one of four categories (e.g., flowers, insects, pleasant, unpleasant). Items from two 
categories (e.g., flowers, pleasant) are sorted to the left using the “E” key on the keyboard, while 
items from the remaining two categories (e.g., insects, unpleasant) are sorted to the right using 
the “I” key on the keyboard. These mappings are counterbalanced and switch for all participants 
halfway through the study. The logic of the IAT is that people will be faster to pair concepts that 
are associated in their minds (e.g., flowers and pleasant) than concepts that are not associated 
(e.g., insects and pleasant). That is, this sorting task should be more challenging and thus take 
longer when the categories to be sorted are weakly associated (or “incongruent”) than when they 
are strongly associated (or “congruent”). If people take longer to pair “pleasant” words with 
pictures of insects than with pictures of flowers, this suggests that they associate flowers over 
insects with this descriptor.  
 Since its inception, the IAT has been used to investigate and document implicit biases in 
thousands of published papers (e.g., as of 4/29/2018, a PsycINFO search of “Implicit Association 
Test” or “IAT” yields 4,357 results). As reviewed by Nosek et al. (2007), IAT measures have 
produced findings suggesting that people from a variety of backgrounds are biased against the 
elderly (vs. youth), Black people (vs. White people), Arab-Muslims (vs. other people), people of 
the Jewish faith (vs. people of other religions), disabled people (vs. abled people), homosexuals 
(vs. heterosexuals), overweight people (vs. thin people), and more. Most relevant to our 
purposes, in a review of the results from a sample of over 600,000 participants who completed 
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online IATs, Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002b) showed that people tend to associate men 
with science and career and, conversely, women with liberal arts and family. The IAT has proven 
itself to be a useful and effective tool in the measurement of implicit biases.  
 Is the IAT a meaningful measure of bias? Although the IAT is widely used and is 
generally considered the “gold standard” when it comes to measuring implicit associations, some 
have called into question its validity. Specifically, some scholars (e.g., Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009) 
have argued that scores on the IAT do not meaningfully predict real-world behavior and thus 
have little or no relevance to society. In what follows, I briefly review a subset of vast literature 
illustrating just the opposite: The IAT is a reliable, valid, and meaningful measure of bias.  
 Beginning with the basics, the IAT is a computer-based task that involves the 
measurement of participants’ reaction times. It is well documented that online computer-based 
tasks (e.g., those run through JavaScript, as are the IATs used in the present studies) are 
acceptable sources of reaction time data collection, comparable to laboratory-based tasks (e.g., 
Chetverikov & Upravitelev, 2016). Turning to reliability, the IAT has been shown to yield 
reasonably consistent scores between multiple assessments. In one review, for example, test-
retest reliabilities for the IAT were found to range from .25 to .69, with a mean and median of 
.50 (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). This level of reliability is superior by 
comparison to other implicit measures, which have an average test-retest reliability of .30 
(Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000).  
More central to the core of the debate, however, is the question of whether the IAT 
meaningfully predicts real-world behavior. In contrast to the claims made by Tetlock and 
Mitchell (2009), the IAT has been shown to correlate moderately well with explicit measures of 
bias. In a large-scale meta-analytic review of 122 research reports (total N = 14,900), Greenwald, 
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Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) show that scores on the IAT significantly predicted 
scores on a host of behavioral, physiological, and judgment measures (r = .274). Similarly, 
another meta-analysis of 81 studies found a relationship between IAT scores and corresponding 
explicit measures of r = .24 (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005), again 
illustrating acceptable predictive validity.  
It is also important to note that part of the usefulness of the IAT is its ability to detect 
associations that participants may otherwise be unaware of or perhaps try to hide. In one study, 
for example, Steffens (2004) found that—across two experiments asking participants to fake 
being conscientious, not conscientious, extroverted, or not extroverted—the IAT was 
significantly less susceptible to faking than explicit questionnaires. It is reasonable, then, to 
expect only moderate correlations between IATs and explicit measures of bias, given that scores 
on the IAT are significantly less likely to be swayed by participant motivation (e.g., self-
enhancement).  
Although the relationships between IAT scores and explicit measures are modest, they 
are practically significant. Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2015) analyzed meta-analytic 
predictive validity estimates that were published both by pro-IAT researchers (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) and by anti-IAT researchers (Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, 
Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). In both cases, estimates of the relationship between IAT scores and 
explicit discriminatory behavior were found to be substantial enough to explain societally 
significant discriminatory behavior.  
The IAT has also been shown to reliably predict real-world discriminatory behavior (see, 
e.g., Jost et al., 2009, for a review and a direct rebuttal to Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009). In one 
study, participants who revealed bias on a gender stereotyping IAT were more likely to dislike 
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and less likely to recommend hiring female (vs. male) managerial applicants, even when the 
women who were applying were presented as more qualified than the men (Rudman & Glick, 
2001). In another study, scores on a racial preference IAT were found to reliably predict 
physicians’ racial disparities in treatment recommendation (Green et al., 2007). Specifically, 
physicians in this study were significantly less likely to recommend a cost-effective, non-
invasive, and low risk procedure to black patients than white ones. As a final example, Arcuri et 
al. (2008) administered an IAT measuring preferences for a left- versus right-wing political 
candidate to undecided voters 1 month before an upcoming election. Scores on this IAT were 
found to significantly predict the eventual voting decisions of these voters. Although by no 
means all-inclusive, these representative studies support the broader conclusion that the IAT is a 
valid predictor of tangible behavior in the real world. 
Overview of Studies  
 The goal of this dissertation is to provide a direct and systematic test of people’s 
stereotypes about the relative intelligence of men versus women. In the following chapters, I 
present the results of six IAT studies (total N = 1,675) illustrating the existence of a pervasive 
societal stereotype associating men—but not women—with intellectual prowess. I provide 
evidence that this stereotype is present for both adults and children across the United States as 
well as adults beyond the United States. In Chapter 2, I describe two studies that investigated the 
existence of a “brilliance = men” stereotype among adults across the US. Chapter 3 examines the 
presence of this stereotype beyond the US. In Chapter 4, I investigate the developmental 
trajectory of the stereotype by administering a child-friendly IAT to samples of 9- and 10-year-
olds from two regions of the United States. In Chapter 5, I turn my attention to another question: 
Could there be a “smart = men” stereotype as well? That is, do the gender stereotypes about 
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intellectual ability extend to more ordinary levels of intelligence, or are they confined to the right 
tail of the distribution? 
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CHAPTER 2: EVIDENCE FOR A “BRILLIANCE = MEN” STEREOTYPE 
 
 In this chapter, I describe two studies that investigated the presence of a “brilliance = 
men” stereotype among adults in the United States. Each study consists of three distinct samples: 
(1) general population participants from across the United States recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (an online participant recruitment platform that has been shown to produce 
generally reliable data; see, e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), (2) undergraduates from 
the University of Illinois, and (3) undergraduates from New York University. Collecting 
multiple, geographically diverse samples allows for an investigation of the reliability of the IAT, 
the consistency of the “brilliance = men” stereotype, and whether populations differ in their bias 
(e.g., general population participants vs. undergraduates).   
Study 1 
Participants 
 Participants for this study were recruited from Mechanical Turk (N = 132, Mage = 35.0 
years, age range: 21–69 years), University of Illinois’ subject pool (N = 139, Mage = 19.6 years, 
age range: 18–23 years), and New York University’s subject pool (N = 142, Mage = 19.4 years, 
age range: 17–26 years), yielding a total sample size of 413 (256 women, 157 men). An 
additional group of 29 participants (18 from Mechanical Turk, 9 from the University of Illinois, 
and 2 from New York University) were tested but excluded from the final sample because they 
went too fast on the IAT (the standards for this criterion were determined by Greenwald et al., 
2003, and are discussed below; n = 14), because they missed all three catch questions in the post-
survey measures (n = 10), or because they had IP addresses from outside the United States (n = 
5). The sample was 49.2% White, 7.0% Black, 26.6% Asian, 10.9% Hispanic, and 6.3% 
multiracial. Participants recruited via Mechanical Turk were compensated $1.75 for their 
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participation, whereas participants recruited via a university subject pool were provided with 
course credit.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants first completed an IAT designed to assess the presence of a “brilliance = 
men” stereotype and were then directed to a post-survey containing a series of explicit measures 
that were predicted to be relevant to this stereotype.  
 IAT task. The IAT used here and in subsequent studies (with minor variations) is a 
browser-based task that participants completed online. In this IAT, participants sort (1) pictures 
of men, (2) pictures of women, (3) words from a “Genius” category, and (4) words from a 
similarly valenced control category (in Study 1, “Creative”). Figure 1 provides annotated 
screenshots of sample trials.  
The pictures used in the IAT were taken from the Chicago Face Database and were 
normed on how old, happy, and attractive the people in them looked (Ma, Correll, &Wittenbrink, 
2015). To eliminate the possibility that participants may artificially judge the men as more 
intelligent because, e.g., they are more attractive or look happier, the 8 men and 8 women used in 
the study were specifically chosen to have equal average ratings of attractiveness (Mmen = 3.55, 
Mwomen = 3.52), happiness (Mmen = 2.58, Mwomen = 2.57), and age (Mmen = 26.12, Mwomen = 25.61). 
Participants in each picture had a neutral facial expression, wore a gray shirt, and were 
positioned in front of a white background.  
In the “Genius” category of words, participants saw the words “genius,” “brilliant,” and 
“super-smart.” I chose these three words because they map most directly onto the high-level 
intellectual abilities I hypothesize are associated with men. In the “Creative” category of words, 
participants sorted the words “creative,” “artistic,” and “super-imaginative.”  
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“Creative” was chosen as the control category for this study for several reasons. First, it 
is similar in valence to “Genius” (i.e., very positive and desirable). To assess whether this is in 
fact the case, I conducted a norming study in which Mechanical Turk participants (N = 47) were 
asked to rate the positivity and desirability of each of the “Genius” and “Creative” category 
words (1 = “Not positive [or desirable] at all” to 9 = “Very positive [or desirable”). Participants’ 
mean ratings of the words in the two categories did not differ in their positivity (MGenius = 7.40, 
MCreative = 7.40, p = .974) or their desirability (MGenius = 7.52, MCreative = 7.43, p = .706). 
Descriptive statistics for each word separately can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix. 
Second, “Creative” and “Genius” are both dimensions that are relevant to cognition. Finally, 
“Creative” is relatively gender-neutral—and may actually be a conservative choice, since some 
evidence suggests that creative, outside-the-box thinking is also associated with men (Proudfoot, 
Kay, & Koval, 2015).  
After a brief set of instructions, participants proceeded through this 7-block IAT (which 
is the typical structure of this test). The first two blocks consist of a two-category sorting task to 
train participants on the mechanics of the IAT. In Block 1, participants sorted pictures of men 
and pictures of women into “Male” and “Female” categories, respectively. In Block 2, 
participants sorted “Genius” words and “Creative” words into their respective categories. Blocks 
3 and 4 were the first test blocks, in which participants sorted all four categories simultaneously. 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to have the “Male” and “Genius” categories first 
appear on the left, and the “Female” and “Creative” categories appear on the right. This is the 
“stereotype-congruent-first” condition, because the category pairings are hypothesized to be 
congruent with people’s preexisting bias (“brilliance = men”). The other half of participants first 
receive “incongruent” pairings: “Female” and “Genius” appear on the left, while “Male” and 
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“Creative” appear on the right. Importantly and regardless of condition, the “Male” and 
“Female” categories switch places in Block 5 (such that “congruent” pairings would in 
subsequent blocks be “incongruent,” and vice versa). Participants therefore encounter both 
“congruent” and “incongruent” test blocks—the difference between conditions lies only in which 
type of block comes first. Block 5 is a two-category training block that orients participants to the 
now-reversed mappings of the “Male” and “Female” categories. Finally, participants complete 
Blocks 6 and 7, four-category test blocks with reversed pairings (such that participants who first 
encountered “Male” and “Genius” paired together are now instead required to sort “Female” and 
“Genius” together, and vice-versa).  
The overall logic of the IAT is as follows: If participants find it easier and so take less 
time to correctly respond to “congruent” trials (when pairing “Male” and “Genius”) than to 
“incongruent” trials (when pairing “Female” and “Genius”), this illustrates that participants 
associate men with this trait, consistent with the hypothesized presence of a “brilliance = men” 
stereotype.  
IAT scores for each participant were analyzed using the publicly available R package 
‘IATScore’ (Storage, 2017), which calculates scores in accordance with the guidelines set forth 
by Greenwald et al. (2003) and produces an IAT effect size (akin to Cohen’s d) for each 
participant. The core of this scoring algorithm involves dividing the difference between mean 
reaction times on “congruent” and “incongruent” blocks by the standard deviation of latencies 
across all associated test trials. Additional practices include excluding trials with reaction times 
over 10,000 milliseconds (which likely reflect inattention), replacing the reaction times for 
incorrect trials with that block’s mean reaction time plus 600 milliseconds (as a penalty for the 
incorrect response), and excluding participants who responded faster than 300 milliseconds on 
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over 10% of trials across the IAT (which suggests that they likely just clicked through the task). 
Greenwald et al. (2003) recommend this scoring algorithm because it demonstrated superior 
performance on several dimensions, including internal consistency, resistance to the effects of 
prior experience taking an IAT, and relative immunity to artifacts of response latency associated 
with participants who naturally respond slowly.  
In addition to analyzing each participant’s overall IAT effect size, I computed two 
separate effect sizes on subsets of each participant’s responses (specifically, on odd vs. even 
trials of the IAT). Having these sets of scores allows for an investigation of the internal 
consistency of the IAT. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the IAT used in Study 1 was α = 
.76 (within samples, αTurk = .68, αUIUC = .73, and αNYU = .82), which is in line with other studies 
using similar procedures to calculate reliability (e.g., Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2011, 
2016; Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011).  
 Post-survey Measures. After completing the IAT, participants were directed to a post-
survey containing a brief demographics questionnaire and a battery of six measures of gender 
bias and sexism. My goal in including these measures was to test whether scores on the IAT 
relate to scores on explicit measures that might be relevant to the predicted bias, which would 
provide evidence for the validity of this IAT. Items within each scale were presented in random 
order.  
 Old-fashioned Sexism. The Old-fashioned Sexism scale (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 
1995) contains five items designed to measure overt gender stereotypic ideology. Old-fashioned 
Sexism is characterized by an endorsement of the importance of traditional gender roles and 
beliefs regarding women as less competent than men. For example, participants are asked to 
express their agreement with statements such as, “Women are generally not as smart as men” and 
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“When both parents are employed and their child gets sick, the school should call the mother 
rather than the father” (see Table 12 in the Appendix for a full list of items included in the Old-
fashioned Sexism scale). Participants rated each item on a scale of 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 6 
(“Strongly agree”).  
 Modern Sexism. The Modern Sexism scale (Swim et al., 1995) measures forms of sexism 
that are more characteristic of today’s society (e.g., denial of ongoing discrimination toward 
women, ambivalence toward women’s continued struggles). For example, participants rate their 
agreement with items such as, “Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the 
United States” and “Society has reached the point where women and men have equal 
opportunities for achievement” (see Table 12 in the Appendix for a full list of the eight items 
included in the Modern Sexism scale). Participants again rated each item on a scale of 1 
(“Strongly disagree”) to 6 (“Strongly agree”).  
 Feminism. Relatedly, I included a measure of feminism, which consists of 20 items taken 
from Morgan’s (1996) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS). In order to limit 
the overall length of the study, I selected two subscales from the larger LFAIS scale (which 
contains a total of 70 items). Specifically, the items included in the present study were those 
from the “Global Goals” and “Discrimination and Subordination (Historical and Current)” 
subscales. I chose these subscales because—when reversed—their items seemed to best map 
onto the sort of sexist ideologies that we are trying to capture with this IAT. Sample items 
include, “Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of 
the United States” and “Even though some things have changed, women are still treated unfairly 
in today’s society,” which participants again rate on a scale of 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 6 
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(“Strongly agree”). See Table 12 in the Appendix for a full list of items included in the Feminism 
scale.   
 Sexism. Because scores on the Old-fashioned Sexism, Modern Sexism, and Feminism 
scales are highly correlated (|rs| range from 0.35 to 0.80 across studies, ps < .001), they were 
averaged into a single composite measure I will hereafter refer to as “Sexism.” Each scale was 
scored such that higher scores signified sexist ideologies (i.e., scores on the Feminism scale were 
reversed such that lower scores reflected higher agreement with feminist ideas). I predict positive 
correlations between scores on the IAT and scores on this composite Sexism measure.  
 Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement. I developed an 8-item scale to measure participants’ 
explicit endorsement of the “brilliance = men” stereotype. Participants rated on a scale of 1 
(“Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly agree”) the extent to which they agree with statements such 
as, “One is more likely to find a male with a genius-level IQ than a female with a genius-level 
IQ” and “Extreme intellectual brilliance is more common in men than in women.” See Table 13 
in the Appendix for a full list of items included in the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement scale. I 
predict a positive correlation between IAT scores and scores on the Brilliance Stereotype 
Endorsement scale, although I expected—given the intensity of these explicitly sexist 
statements—that this relationship would be small to moderate at best. 
 Brilliance Stereotype Perception. The Brilliance Stereotype Perception scale consists of 
the same 8 items as the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement scale (see Table 13 in the Appendix). 
After first rating the extent to which they personally agree with each statement, participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which society at large agrees with these statements (regardless of what 
they themselves believe).  
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 Conservatism and Right-wing Authoritarianism. I also included 2 measures of political 
orientation, which have been found in the past to correlate with bias toward lower status groups 
(e.g., Heaven & Oxman, 1999). First, participants completed a one-item measure of political 
conservatism (“One a scale of 1 [Very Liberal] to 9 [Very Conservative], please rate how 
conservative or liberal you consider yourself”). Additionally, I included the widely used Right-
wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981). This 20-item measure asks participants to rate 
on a 1 (“Disagree strongly”) to 9 (“Agree strongly”) scale their agreement with items such as, 
“What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us 
back to our true path” and “This country would work a lot better if certain groups of 
troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.” See Table 
14 in the Appendix for a full list of items included in the Right-wing Authoritarian scale. I 
predicted small-to-medium positive relationships between IAT scores and these measures of 
conservative political orientation.  
 Attention Checks. I included 3 attention checks in the post-survey measures (e.g., “For 
the question below, please show you are paying attention by selecting Agree strongly”). One 
question was presented in the Modern Sexism scale, one in the Brilliance Stereotype 
Endorsement scale, and the last in the Right-wing Authoritarianism scale. Participants who gave 
the wrong answer to all 3 catch questions were excluded from the study. 
Analysis Plan 
Stereotyped associations appear stronger when tested at the start of the IAT (in Blocks 3 
and 4) rather than at the end of the IAT (in Blocks 6 and 7; see, e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Nosek et al., 2002a). In these data as well, I found a consistent order effect such that participants 
in the “stereotype-congruent-first” condition yielded significantly greater IAT scores than 
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participants in the “stereotype-incongruent-first” condition (MCongruentFirst = 0.33, MIncongruentFirst = 
0.16, p < .001). As a result, here and throughout this dissertation, I will present marginal means 
that control for block order (i.e., hold block order constant). In no cases, however, do differences 
between raw and marginal means change the findings. For each study, I also provide regression 
output and, when appropriate, discuss differences between IAT scores as a function of gender, 
testing location, and more. After reporting the mean IAT effect sizes in each study—the main 
analyses of interest—I turn to a discussion of relationships between the IAT and the explicit 
measures included in the post-survey. Means and correlations will be followed by 95% 
confidence intervals throughout. 
Results and Discussion 
 IAT effect sizes. The main prediction for Study 1 was of a positive, significant overall 
mean IAT effect size, which would indicate that participants associate men rather than women 
with intellectual giftedness. Consistent with this prediction, the mean IAT effect size for all 
participants across Study 1’s three samples was 0.24 [0.20, 0.27], which differed significantly 
from 0 (p < .001). For comparison, a meta-analysis conducted in 2007 showed that, for web-
based IATs administered between 2000 and 2006, the average IAT effect size for the Gender–
Science IAT was 0.37 (total N = 299,298) and the average IAT effect size for Gender–Math IAT 
was 0.39 (total N = 83,084). 
The tendency to associate “Genius” with men over women was consistent across all three 
samples (MTurk = 0.17 [0.11, 0.23], MUIUC = 0.28 [0.23, 0.34], MNYU = 0.25 [0.19, 0.30]) and for 
men (Mmen,Turk = 0.25 [0.18, 0.32], Mmen,UIUC = 0.40 [0.32, 0.49], Mmen,NYU = 0.35 [0.27, 0.42]) 
and women (Mwomen,Turk = 0.12 [0.04, 0.21], Mwomen,UIUC = 0.21 [0.14, 0.27], Mwomen,NYU = 0.18 
[0.11, 0.26]) in each sample separately (all ps ≤ .004). See Figure 2 for a bar plot depicting 
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marginal means by gender and testing location and Figure 3 for a dot plot and overlain box-and-
whisker plot depicting the raw IAT scores across samples.  
Regression predicting IAT scores. I also submitted these data to a regression with 
gender (men, women), block order (stereotype-congruent-first, stereotype-incongruent-first), 
testing location (Mechanical Turk, University of Illinois, New York University), and all 
interaction terms predicting IAT scores (see Table 15 in the Appendix). I found significant main 
effects of gender and testing location, with Bonferroni-adjusted follow-up tests showing that men 
scored higher on the IAT than women (p < .001) and participants recruited at the University of 
Illinois (and New York University, although this difference only trended toward significance) 
scored higher on the IAT than those recruited via Mechanical Turk (p = .018). While it is 
perhaps not surprising that associations between “genius” and men are stronger for men than for 
women, the finding that undergraduates at the University of Illinois—a large, R1 university—
show more bias than general population participants from across the United States was less 
expected. One possible explanation for this finding is that undergraduate students’ perceptions of 
which gender is more brilliant are being shaped by their experiences while immersed in the 
university setting. For example, students may notice that men dominate (in number) many of the 
“prestigious, hard science” fields, or that most of their professors in general are men. This may, 
in turn, cause students to associate “brilliance” and “genius” with men over women to a greater 
extent than participants in the general population.  
 Relationships with explicit measures. A secondary prediction was that the implicit 
“brilliance = men” bias measured by the IAT would correlate with the explicit measures of 
sexism and political conservatism contained in the post-survey. As predicted, IAT scores were 
significantly correlated with the composite Sexism measure, r(411) = 0.18 [0.08, 0.27], p < .001, 
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such that participants who associated men over women with “Genius” on the IAT were more 
likely to endorse sexist and anti-feminist statements in the post-survey. Participants who scored 
highly on the IAT were also more likely to explicitly endorse the “brilliance = men” stereotype, 
as measured by the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement scale, r(411) = 0.10 [0.004, 0.20], p = 
.050. Finally, there was a marginally significant relationship between IAT scores and political 
conservatism, r(411) = 0.09 [–0.01, 0.19], p = .067, such that participants who reported being 
more politically conservative scored higher on the IAT. See Table 1 for a full correlation table of 
measures included in Study 1.  
In addition to looking at raw correlations between IAT scores and the explicit measures 
included in the post-survey, I also investigated whether these relationships remain even when 
looking within gender. To do so, I computed correlations that partialled out participants’ gender; 
these partial correlations provide an estimate of the aggregate within-gender correlations 
between the IAT and the post-survey measures. Even after controlling for gender, participants’ 
IAT scores correlated significantly in the predicted direction with Sexism, r(411) = 0.11 [0.01, 
0.20], p = .032, as well as with each component of Sexism (as was the case with the raw 
correlations), and trended toward significance with political conservatism, r(411) = 0.08 [–0.02, 
0.18], p = .100. See Table 2 for a full table of partial correlations controlling for gender across all 
measures included in Study 1, as well as Tables 16 and 17 in the Appendix for separate 
correlation tables for each gender.  
Study 2 
  In Study 1, I provided evidence across three distinct samples that (1) adults associate 
“genius” and “brilliance” with men over women and that (2) this tendency correlates with several 
explicit measures of bias. The primary goals of Study 2 were to replicate Study 1 and to control 
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for a possible confound. Specifically, one could in principle argue that a “Female + Creative” 
association—rather than a “Male + Genius” association—was responsible for the results 
observed in Study 1. A single IAT in and of itself cannot rule out such a possibility. The strategy 
I took to address this alternative explanation was to change the control category in Study 2 from 
“Creative” to “Happy,” which I pretested to be gender neutral. If I observe the same results with 
this new control category, it becomes more likely that a “Male + Genius” association is at play—
as opposed to the alternative that both “Female + Creative” and “Female + Happy” associations 
are driving the effects. To test this possibility, I again recruited participants from three distinct 
samples: Mechanical Turk, University of Illinois, and New York University.  
Participants 
 As mentioned above, participants for this study were recruited from Mechanical Turk (N 
= 131, Mage = 33.0 years, age range: 18–67 years), University of Illinois’ subject pool (N = 137, 
Mage = 19.4 years, age range 18–24 years), and New York University’s subject pool (N = 136, 
Mage = 19.8 years, age range 18–40 years), yielding a total N of 404 (264 women, 140 men). An 
additional group of 25 participants (17 from Mechanical Turk, 6 from the University of Illinois, 
and 2 from New York University) were tested but excluded from the final sample because they 
went too fast on the IAT (n = 13), because they missed all three catch questions in the post-
survey measures (n = 8), because they had IP addresses from outside the United States (n = 3), or 
because they did not report their gender (n = 1). The sample was 48.3% White, 7.7% Black, 
29.0% Asian, 7.7% Hispanic, and 7.3% multiracial. Participants recruited via Mechanical Turk 
were compensated $1.75 for their participation, whereas participants recruited via a university 




Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure were identical to Study 1, with the exception of the IAT 
task.  
 “Genius vs. Happy” IAT Task. To ensure that Study 1’s effects were driven primarily 
by the “Genius” category—rather than the comparison trait of “Creative”—I designed an IAT 
task that used “Happy” words for the control category. I chose this comparison trait because a 
norming study indicated there are no differences in perceptions of happiness on the basis of 
gender: I presented the word “Happy,” along with 16 other trait words (e.g., honest, healthy, 
cool), to a separate sample of Mechanical Turk participants and asked them to rate the extent to 
which they associate this trait with a particular gender (0 = “I associate it exclusively with 
males,” 100 = “I associate it exclusively with females”). Participants’ responses indicated that 
they perceived happiness to be gender neutral (M = 50.62, N = 101). Additionally, faces from the 
Chicago Face Database are normed for how happy they look, and I matched the “Male” and 
“Female” stimuli to have equal overall “happiness” ratings (Mmen = 2.58, Mwomen = 2.57). The 
“Happy” category consisted of the words “happy,” “joyful,” and “super-upbeat.” Norming data 
from Mechanical Turk (N = 47) show that the “Happy” words did not differ from the “Genius” 
words in their positivity (MGenius = 7.40, MHappy = 7.26, p = .502) or their desirability (MGenius = 
7.52, MHappy = 7.38, p = .581). See Table 11 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics for each of 
the words used in the IAT. The three other categories—“Genius” (“genius,” “brilliant,” and 
“super-smart”), “Male” (8 pictures of men), and “Female” (8 pictures of women)—were 
identical to those in Study 1’s IAT.  
As in Study 1, I computed two separate effect sizes on subsets of each participant’s 
responses (again, on odd vs. even trials of the IAT) in order to estimate the internal consistency 
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of the IAT. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the “Genius vs. Happy” IAT used in Study 2 
was α = .75 (within samples, αTurk = .67, αUIUC = .78, and αNYU = .78), demonstrating internal 
consistency similar to that of Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
 IAT effect sizes. The primary objective for Study 2 was to test whether the results of 
Study 1 (which I interpreted as indicating the presence of a “brilliance = men” stereotype) would 
replicate with a new control category—“Happy.” The mean IAT effect size across all three 
samples was 0.20 [0.16, 0.23], which again differed significantly from 0 (p < .001). Illustrating 
the consistency and pervasiveness of this “brilliance = men” stereotype, I found that the tendency 
to associate “Genius” with men over women was consistent across all three samples (MTurk = 
0.16 [0.10, 0.21], MUIUC = 0.29 [0.24, 0.35], MNYU = 0.17 [0.11, 0.23]) and for men (Mmen,Turk = 
0.13 [0.06, 0.20], Mmen,UIUC = 0.20 [0.10, 0.30], Mmen,NYU = 0.12 [0.01, 0.24]) and women 
(Mwomen,Turk = 0.17 [0.10, 0.25], Mwomen,UIUC = 0.29 [0.24, 0.35], Mwomen,NYU = 0.19 [0.13, 0.26]) 
in each sample separately (all ps ≤ .041) (see Figures 4 and 5).  
 Regression predicting IAT scores. As in Study 1, I also submitted these data to a 
regression with gender (men, women), block order (stereotype-congruent-first, stereotype-
incongruent-first), testing location (Mechanical Turk, University of Illinois, New York 
University), and all interactions predicting IAT scores (see Table 18 in the Appendix). As in 
Study 1, I found a main effect of testing location, with Bonferroni-adjusted follow-up tests 
revealing that undergraduates at the University of Illinois scored significantly higher on the IAT 
than participants recruited from Mechanical Turk (p = .019) and marginally higher than 
undergraduates at New York University (p = .061). Interestingly, I also found of main effect of 
gender in the opposite direction to that of Study 1, such that women scored significantly higher 
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than men on the IAT (p = .041). In a separate analysis, I found a significant gender × study 
interaction, F(1,813) = 24.81, p < .001, driven by a decrease in men’s scores in Study 2 relative 
to Study 1 (women’s scores remained stable). Because the only difference between Studies 1 and 
2 is the control trait, “Happy,” one possible explanation for this finding is that men associate 
both “Genius” and “Happy” with their own gender (pulling their average IAT effect size toward 
0 in Study 2), whereas women do not. 
 Relationships with explicit measures. The relationships between IAT scores and both 
Sexism, r(402) = 0.01 [–0.09, 0.11], p = .825, and Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement, r(402) = 
0.06 [–0.04, 0.15], p = .257, did not reach significance in Study 2 (see Table 3). However, 
participants’ IAT scores correlated as in Study 1 with political conservatism, r(400) = 0.12 [0.03, 
0.22], p = .014, such that participants who reported being politically conservative scored higher 
on the IAT. Similarly, I found a significant, positive correlation between IAT scores and Right-
wing Authoritarianism, r(402) = 0.14 [0.04, 0.23], p = .006, again linking right-wing political 
ideation with the tendency to associate “Genius” with men over women.  
After controlling for gender, relationships between IAT scores and these explicit 
measures interestingly increased in strength. The correlation between IAT scores and Old-
fashioned Sexism, for example, trends towards significance after partialling out gender, r(401) = 
0.08 [–0.02, 0.18], p = .100, as does the correlation between IAT scores and participants’ 
responses on the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement scale, r(401) = 0.10 [–0.003, 0.19], p = .058. 
Relationships between IAT scores and both Right-wing Authoritarianism, r(401) = 0.16 [0.06, 
0.25], p = .002, and political conservatism, r(399) = 0.14 [0.04, 0.24], p = .005, retained—or 
even increased—their magnitude and thus remained significant. See Table 4 for a full table of 
41 
 
partial correlations controlling for gender across all measures included in Study 2, as well as 
Tables 19 and 20 in the Appendix for separate correlation tables for each gender. 
Chapter 2 Summary 
 Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence for a pervasive implicit “brilliance = men” stereotype 
in our society. The tendency to associate men rather than women with “Genius” was consistent 
across gender (men, women), sample (Turk, UIUC, NYU), block order (stereotype-congruent-
first, stereotype-incongruent-first), and comparison trait (“Creative” vs. “Happy”). It also 
correlated with explicit measures of gender bias (in Study 1) and conservative political 
orientation (in both studies).  
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CHAPTER 3: BRILLIANCE STEREOTYPES BEYOND THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Chapter 2 illustrated that there exists a pervasive “brilliance = men” stereotype in our 
society. In Chapter 3, I sought to investigate the cross-cultural generalizability of these results: Is 
this bias specific to the United States, or do we also find evidence for the “brilliance = men” 
stereotype in other regions beyond the United States? To address this question, I conducted a 




 To collect an online sample of participants from outside the United States, I turned again 
to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which allows researchers to filter out participants that meet 
specified criteria (e.g., participants from within the United States). To ensure that recruited 
participants were, in fact, from outside the United States, I also collected the IP addresses of each 
participant (which reveal the participant’s location). (Note, too, that Mechanical Turk does not 
support accounts for people from the United States who are residing outside the United States; 
tax information is required by Amazon when registering for an account on Mechanical Turk to 
verify non-US status.) The final sample included 511 participants (360 men, 151 women) 
ranging from 18 to 64 years in age (Mage = 31.0 years). An additional group of 24 participants 
were tested but excluded from the final sample because they went too fast on the IAT (n = 12), 
because their IP addresses indicated they were within the United States (n = 9), or because they 
did not indicate their gender (n = 3).  
 I was able to obtain a diverse sample that included participants from 70 countries. I 
grouped these countries into 8 different regions based on a classification system set forth by the 
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United Nations Statistics Division (2010): Canada (containing only participants from Canada), 
Eastern and Southeastern Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam), Eastern Europe (e.g., 
Albania, Greece, Romania), Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, 
Dominican Republic), Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa), 
Southern Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), Western Asia (e.g., Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey), and Western Europe (e.g., Belgium, Germany, Iceland). An additional 6 participants 
were not included in the analyses because they did not belong to the broader regions above. See 
Table 21 in the Appendix for the full list of countries represented in Study 3 as well as their 
relative mappings to corresponding regions.  
Materials and Procedure 
 Before being able to participate in the study, participants were required to complete a 
questionnaire that was primarily designed to screen for English proficiency. (A certain level of 
proficiency with the English language is necessary to understand the instructions of the IAT and 
to respond appropriately to the IAT itself and the measures in the post-survey.) The pre-screen 
contained four multiple-choice questions with answers that should be obvious to anyone who 
speaks English (e.g., “If someone robbed you, how would you feel?”, with the answer options 
being “Good,” “Happy,” “Energetic,” and “Sad”). Participants were not allowed to participate in 
the study if they gave the wrong answer to over 50% of these questions.  
Participants who passed the English comprehension check (all but 5) were directed to an 
IAT task identical to that in Study 1 (i.e., where participants categorized “Genius” and 
“Creative” words). The categories used in the IAT were as follows: “Genius” (“genius,” 
“brilliant,” “super-smart”), “Creative” (“creative,” “artistic,” “super-imaginative”), “Male” (8 
pictures of men), and “Female” (8 pictures of women). The internal consistency of the IAT was 
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similar to that of prior studies, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of α = .69. After completing 
the IAT, participants were directed to a post-survey containing the following explicit measures: 
Old-fashioned Sexism, Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement, and Brilliance Stereotype Perception. 
The other explicit measures used in Studies 1 and 2 (e.g., Feminism) are specific to the cultural 
context of the United States and were thus omitted from this study.  
Results and Discussion 
IAT effect sizes. The main objective for Study 3 was to investigate whether the 
“brilliance = men” stereotype extends beyond the United States. This was found to be the case: 
Participants were overall more likely to associate “brilliance” and “genius” with men over 
women (M = 0.23 [0.21, 0.26], p < .001), and this tendency was present for both male 
participants (M = 0.26 [0.23, 0.29], p < .001) and female participants (M = 0.18 [0.12, 0.23], p < 
.001) in the sample. As in prior studies using the “Genius vs. Creative” IAT, men’s IAT scores 
were significantly greater than women’s (p = .011) (see Table 22 in the Appendix).   
Further, I found evidence for the “brilliance = men” stereotype in every region for which 
I collected data. Average IAT effect sizes were significantly greater than 0 for participants from 
Canada (M = 0.29 [0.20, 0.38], p < .001), Eastern and Southeastern Asia (M = 0.32 [0.22, 0.42], 
p < .001), Eastern Europe (M = 0.25 [0.17, 0.32], p < .001), Latin America and the Caribbean (M 
= 0.23 [0.17, 0.29], p < .001), Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa (M = 0.14 [0.02, 0.25], p = 
.024), Southern Asia (M = 0.16 [0.11, 0.22], p < .001), Western Asia (M = 0.21 [0.07, 0.36], p = 
.005), and Western Europe (M = 0.30 [0.26, 0.35], p < .001). See Figure 6 for visual depictions 
of marginal means by region (holding constant gender and condition), and Figure 7 for a graph 
of the raw data with overlain box-and-whisker plots (also split by region).  
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Relationships with explicit measures. IAT scores did not correlate significantly to 
scores on the Old-fashioned Sexism, Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement, or Brilliance Stereotype 
Perception scales, perhaps because these measures contained items that were too linguistically 
demanding for some participants in the sample (see Table 5; also see Table 6 for a full table of 
partial correlations controlling for gender across all measures included in Study 3, as well as 
Tables 23 and 24 in the Appendix for separate correlation tables for each gender). 
Chapter 3 Summary 
Study 3 is the first to document the presence of an implicit “brilliance = men” stereotype 
outside the United States. The results of Study 3—taken in combination with those of prior 
studies reported in this dissertation—support the possibility that people both in and beyond the 
United States tend to associate intellectual giftedness with men more than women.
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CHAPTER 4: CHILDREN’S PERCEPTIONS OF WHO’S BRILLIANT 
 
 Thus far, I have presented evidence that adults both inside and outside the United States 
associate intellectual prowess with men over women. If adults have this association, then, the 
question arises: When do children begin to adopt it? Prior work using explicit measures suggests 
that children may be sensitive to this stereotype from as young as 6 years of age (Bian, Leslie, & 
Cimpian, 2017). The present study makes three contributions that go beyond the work of Bian 
and colleagues. First, it assesses the presence of an implicit association between brilliance and 
men. Second, it assesses the presence of this stereotype in an age group that has not been the 
target of prior work on this topic (namely, 9- and 10-year-olds). Third, it assesses the extent to 
which the implicit “brilliance = men” stereotype is shared by children from two geographically 




 I recruited a total of 103 children (51 girls, 52 boys) from Urbana, Illinois (N = 53) and 
New York City, New York (N = 50). Having data from these two samples allowed for an 
investigation into whether there are regional differences in the stereotype (i.e., between a small 
city in the Midwest and a large city on the East Coast) and further addresses the generalizability 
of the “brilliance = men” stereotype. Children were between 9 and 10 years of age (Mage = 9.98 
years). These ages were chosen because, based on pilot testing, they were the earliest ages at 
which children could produce reliable data on the IAT task that was used with adults. (Using the 
same IAT task allows for direct comparisons between child and adult participants across studies.) 
The sample was 62.2% White, 10.2% Asian, 6.1% Hispanic, 5.1% Black, and 16.3% multiracial. 
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An additional group of 3 children (1 from Illinois and 2 from New York) were tested but 
excluded from the final sample for going too fast on the IAT (n = 1), because the servers hosting 
the IAT were temporarily down at the time of testing (n = 1), or because the recruited child was 
too young to participate in the study (n = 1). All children were tested in a quiet laboratory 
environment.   
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure were similar to those of Study 1, with three exceptions. 
First, children underwent extra training before the IAT. Specifically, children were trained on 
each of the words that would be used in the IAT. I asked children to both pronounce and define 
each of the six words used in the task, and gave them the correct answers afterward to reinforce 
their understanding. Children in the study performed exceedingly well in the training, with 
97.0% accuracy in pronouncing and 96.3% accuracy in defining each word. Second, I updated 
the IAT to have a streamlined and simplified set of instructions; an experimenter walked children 
through these instructions. Children also had an opportunity to ask questions about the 
mechanics of the task before beginning. In all other regards, the IAT itself was identical to the 
task used in Study 1, in which participants categorized “Genius” and “Creative” words. The 
IAT’s internal consistency was α = .61 in this study. The third and final change was to remove 
the post-survey measures of sexism and conservatism, which were not appropriate for children.   
Results and Discussion 
 IAT effect sizes. The results of Study 4 mirror those of all prior studies: Children, as 
adults, tended to associate “brilliance” and “genius” with men over women (M = 0.23 [0.20, 
0.26], p < .001). Moreover, this effect was consistent for both testing locations (MIllinois = 0.20 
[0.12, 0.28], MNewYork = 0.32 [0.23, 0.40], ps < .001) and for both boys (Mboys,Illinois = 0.15 [0.04, 
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0.27], Mboys,NewYork = 0.39 [0.25, 0.52], ps ≤ .009) and girls (Mgirls,Illinois = 0.24 [0.13, 0.35], 
Mgirls,NewYork = 0.24 [0.14, 0.35], ps < .001) within each sample independently (see Figures 8 and 
9).  
Notably, children’s mean IAT effect sizes closely matched those of adults in prior 
studies. The overall means in Studies 1 and 2, for example, were 0.24 and 0.20, respectively (vs. 
0.23 in this study). Consistent with prior work (Bian et al., 2017), children’s overall mean IAT 
effect size of 0.23 points to the conclusion that children—like adults—favor the intellectual 
abilities of men over those of women. In other words, these results suggest that the “brilliance = 
men” stereotype operates implicitly and is present starting in childhood.  
 Regression predicting IAT scores. I also submitted these data to a multiple regression 
with gender (boys, girls), block order (stereotype-congruent-first, stereotype-incongruent-first), 
testing location (Urbana, IL, New York City, NY), and all interactions predicting IAT scores (see 
Table 25 in the Appendix). Interestingly and in contrast to Study 1, boys and girls did not differ 
in their tendency to associate “brilliance” with men over women (p = .705). There was a main 
effect of testing location, however, with Bonferroni-adjusted follow-up tests revealing that 
children in New York scored significantly higher on the IAT than children in Illinois (p = .047). 
Notably, however, there were two outliers—defined as any value beyond 1.5 times the 
interquartile range of IAT scores away from the boundaries of the interquartile range—with 
negative IAT scores in the Illinois sample. Once removed, the observed difference between 
testing locations was no longer significant (p = .115). We would thus urge caution in interpreting 





Chapter 4 Summary 
In Study 4, I designed a child-friendly IAT and administered it to children from two 
locations in the US: Urbana, IL and New York City, NY. The results showed that children from 
both locations tended to associate “brilliance” and “genius” with men over women. Moreover, 
the magnitude of these effects was similar to that of adult participants, pointing to the possibility 
that these associations are fully formed by age 9. 
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CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE FOR A “SMART = MEN” STEREOTYPE 
 
 The studies presented thus far have provided consistent evidence for a pervasive 
“brilliance = men” stereotype in our society. In Chapter 5, I turn to the question of whether this 
stereotype is exclusive to high-level intelligence. If people associate “genius” and “brilliance” 
primarily with men, do they also associate more middling descriptors of intelligence with men 
over women? For example, could there be a “smart = men” stereotype, or is the bias specific to 
high-end superlatives about intelligence? To test this question, I designed two studies that used 
altered versions of the IAT employed in previous studies. Specifically, I lowered the intensity of 
the “Genius” category of words into a new “Smart” category, allowing us to test for the presence 
of a “smart = men” stereotype. 
Study 5  
Participants 
 To investigate whether people associate “intelligence” with men over women, I recruited 
119 participants (67 women, 52 men) from Mechanical Turk (Mage = 34.7 years, age range: 19 to 
66). An additional group of 11 participants were tested but excluded from the final sample 
because they went too fast on the IAT (n = 8) or because they had IP addresses from outside the 
United States (n = 3). The sample was 73.1% White, 12.6% Black, 4.2% Asian, 8.4% Hispanic, 
and 1.7% multiracial. Participants were compensated $1.75 for their participation. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure for Study 5 were identical to Study 1, with the exception of 
an altered IAT task. After completing the new IAT, participants were directed to a post-survey 
and completed the same battery of explicit measures as in Study 1.  
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 “Smart vs. Creative” IAT Task. The new “Smart” category in the “Smart vs. Creative” 
IAT contained a set of words similar to the “Genius” category used in prior studies, but with 
reduced intensity. Thus, the stimuli in the “Smart” category were “smart,” “intelligent,” and 
“clever.” Because the “Creative” stimuli used in Studies 1 and 2 were designed to be matched in 
positivity and desirability to “Genius,” I also needed to ensure that participants would not 
perceive the “Creative” stimuli to be overall more attractive than the “Smart” stimuli. (If one 
category is perceived as significantly more desirable than the other, it is conceivable that 
participants might preferentially associate the more desirable category with their gender.) 
Accordingly, I changed the “Creative” category to include the words “creative,” “artistic,” and 
“imaginative” (formerly “super-imaginative”). In all other regards, the “Smart vs. Creative” IAT 
was identical to that used in Study 1.  
 Surprisingly, the internal consistency of the “Smart vs. Creative” IAT was lower than that 
observed in prior studies, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of α = .50. Notably, however, a 
Bonferroni-adjusted outlier test using R’s ‘car’ package—widely used for regression 
diagnostics—revealed that there were two participants with pairs of IAT effect sizes that differed 
substantially from the regression line (ps = .026 and .144). For example, one participant’s IAT 
effect sizes were –1.01 on odd trials and .64 on even trials, likely indicating inattention during 
the task. When these outliers are removed, the internal consistency of the “Smart vs. Creative” 
IAT improves considerably (α = .59).  
Results and Discussion 
 IAT effect sizes. The primary goal of Study 5 was to determine whether participants 
associate men more than women with “intelligence.” Results suggest that this is, indeed, the 
case. Specifically, I found an overall mean IAT effect size of 0.15 [.10, .21], p < .001 (see 
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Figures 10 and 11). Further, this effect was consistent both for male (M = 0.19 [.12, .26], p < 
.001) and female (M = 0.13 [.05, .20], p = .001) participants in the sample. These associations 
did not differ significantly as a function of participants’ gender (see Table 26 in the Appendix). 
Scores on the “Smart vs. Creative” IAT used in this study did not differ significantly from 
Mechanical Turk participants’ scores in Study 1’s “Genius vs. Creative” IAT, t(248) = 0.896 [–
0.04, 0.11], p = .371, suggesting that associations about intelligence may be similar in magnitude 
to associations about brilliance and genius.  
Relationships to explicit measures. In contrast to prior studies, scores on the “Smart vs. 
Creative” IAT did not significantly correlate with any of the explicit measures included in the 
post-survey (see Table 7 for a full table of raw correlations between measures in Study 5, Table 8 
for partial correlations controlling for gender, and Tables 27 and 28 in the Appendix for 
correlations computed separately for men and women in the study). One possibility for this 
discrepancy is that many of the post-survey measures (e.g., the Brilliance Stereotype 
Endorsement scale) were hypothesized to relate specifically to a “brilliance = men” stereotype, 
not a “smart = men” stereotype. These results as a whole nonetheless suggest that people may be 
more likely to associate “intelligence” (and not just “brilliance”) with men over women.   
Study 6 
Although the main prediction of the stereotype portion of the FAB Hypothesis is for a 
“brilliance = men” hypothesis, the results of Study 5 suggest that there may be a related “smart = 
men” stereotype at play as well. To build on these findings, I designed a sixth study with two 
main goals. The first goal of Study 6 was to assess whether we could replicate the “smart = men” 
stereotype identified in Study 5. The second goal of Study 6 was to ensure that the effect found 
in Study 5 was not due to a “creative = women” stereotype (since, again, a single IAT in 
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isolation cannot control for such a possibility). My strategy in approaching Study 6 was similar 
to that of Study 2: If I replace the IAT’s “Creative” category with a different control category 
and find the same results, this increases confidence in the idea that the effects are driven by 
participants’ associations with “Smart” rather than with “Creative.” As a result, I designed a new 
“Smart vs. Happy” IAT to explore this potential alternative explanation for the results of Study 
5.   
Participants 
For Study 6, I recruited 125 participants (70 women, 55 men) from Mechanical Turk 
(Mage = 36.1 years, age range: 20 to 69). An additional 21 participants were tested but excluded 
from the final sample because they went too fast on the IAT (n = 14), because they had IP 
addresses from outside the United States (n = 4), because they missed all three catch questions 
included in the post-survey (n = 2), or because they did not report their gender (n = 1). The 
sample was 84.0% White, 6.4% Black, 3.2% Asian, 4.0% Hispanic, and 2.4% multiracial. 
Participants were awarded $1.75 for their participation in the study.  
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to Study 5, except that the “Smart” IAT’s 
control category was changed from “Creative” to “Happy.” After completing the IAT, 
participants were directed to a post-survey and completed the same battery of explicit measures 
as in prior studies. 
 “Smart vs. Happy” IAT task. The IAT used in Study 6 was identical to Study 5’s 
“Smart vs. Creative” IAT, except for a new control category—“Happy”—chosen for the same 
reasons outlined in Study 2. This “Happy” category was similar to that used in Study 2, but 
contained words of slightly reduced intensity to match the desirability of the words in the 
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“Smart” category. Specifically, I used the words “happy,” “joyful,” and “upbeat” (formerly, 
“super-upbeat”). The other three categories were “Smart” (“smart,” “intelligent,” and “clever”), 
“Male” (8 pictures of men), and “Female” (8 pictures of women). The internal consistency of the 
“Smart vs. Happy” IAT was considerably higher than that of Study 5, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of α = .78.  
Results and Discussion 
IAT effect sizes. As predicted, participants were overall more likely to associate 
“intelligence” with men over women even when the comparison trait was “happy” (M = 0.14 
[.08, .19], p < .001) (see Figures 12 and 13). The average IAT effect size was also independently 
significant for female participants (M = 0.18 [.11, .25], p < .001) and marginally significant for 
male participants (M = 0.08 [–.01, .17], p = .094). IAT scores did not differ significantly as a 
function of participants’ gender (see Table 29 in the Appendix). Finally, participants’ scores on 
the “Smart vs. Happy” IAT used in this study did not differ significantly from Mechanical Turk 
participants’ scores on the “Genius vs. Happy” IAT used in Study 2, t(254) = 0.349 [–0.07, 
0.09], p = .728.   
Relationships with explicit measures. As in Study 5, scores on the “Smart” IAT did not 
significantly correlate with explicit measures contained in the post-survey, aside from a weak 
correlation with political conservatism after controlling for participants’ gender, r(122) = 0.16 
[−0.02, 0.33], p = .078 (see Table 9 for a full table of raw correlations between measures in 
Study 6, Table 10 for partial correlations controlling for gender, and Tables 30 and 31 in the 




Chapter 5 Summary 
 Studies 5 and 6 extended the results of the first four studies by providing initial evidence 
consistent with the idea that people’s perceptions of men as more intellectually gifted than 
women may not be exclusive to high-level “brilliance.” Specifically, mean IAT scores on two 
“Smart” IATs—each with a unique control category—suggested that people also tend to 
implicitly associate garden-variety “intelligence” with men over women.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 In this chapter, I used data collected across multiple studies (1, 2, 5, and 6) to perform 
two supplemental analyses. First, I investigated whether there are differences in the extent to 
which undergraduates associate intellectual ability with men over women as a function of their 
major. Are Psychology majors, for example, less biased than students majoring in STEM fields? 
Second, I used the data collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to assess whether participants 
differ in their biases depending on which region of the US they reside in (e.g., West vs. South). 
These analyses allow for further investigation into the consistency and generalizability of the 
proposed “brilliance = men” stereotype.  
IAT Scores by Undergraduate Major 
 In Studies 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c, I collected information regarding each participant’s major. I 
categorized students into one of four different groups based on their majors: (1) Business and 
Economics, (2) Psychology, (3) Social Sciences and Humanities, and (4) Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics. (Majors were sorted into fields to match as closely as possible 
classifications made by the National Science Foundation, 2015; see Table 32 in the Appendix for 
a list of all majors represented in the sample as well as their relative mappings to each of these 
fields.) 105 of the original 554 undergraduates across Studies 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c were excluded 
because they failed to report their major (n = 7), they indicated a track (e.g., “pre-med”) without 
specifying the associated major (n = 4), their major was undecided or undeclared (n = 15), their 
majors could not be appropriately sorted into one of the four pre-determined categories described 
above (n = 28), or because they double-majored in fields that crossed the boundaries of multiple 
domains (n = 51). The final sample included 449 undergraduates (308 women, 141 men).  
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 Results showed that associations between men and “genius” are robust. Specifically, I 
found that IAT scores remain positive and significantly different from 0 for undergraduates 
majoring in Business and Economics (M = 0.28 [0.21, 0.36], p < .001), Psychology (M = 0.26 
[0.21, 0.30], p < .001), Social Sciences and Humanities (M = 0.25 [0.15, 0.34], p < .001), and 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (M = 0.20 [0.14, 0.26], p < .001). See 
Figures 14 and 15 in the Appendix for visual representations of these data. I also submitted these 
data to a regression with gender (men, women), block order (stereotype-congruent-first, 
stereotype-incongruent-first), testing location (University of Illinois, New York University), 
major (Business and Economics, Psychology, Social Sciences and Humanities, Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), and all interaction terms predicting IAT scores (see 
Table 33 in the Appendix). Bonferroni-adjusted follow-up tests did not reveal any differences in 
average IAT scores for students majoring in different fields. These findings further illustrate the 
prevalence of the stereotype we are investigating here, and accord well with prior research 
suggesting a “brilliance = men” stereotype across a range of disciplines (e.g., Storage et al., 
2016).  
IAT Scores by Region of the United States 
 In Studies 1a, 2a, 5, and 6, I collected data from a total of 506 participants from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. These participants came from states across the United States: In 
total, 47 of the 50 states were represented (all but Georgia, Montana, and North Dakota). The 
geographical diversity of the participants allows for a test of whether there are differences in the 
strength of gender stereotypes about intellectual ability across different regions of the United 
States. To answer this question, I first categorized each of the 47 states into one of four regions: 
West (e.g., California, Colorado), Midwest (e.g., Illinois, Indiana), South (e.g., Arkansas, Texas), 
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and Northeast (e.g., New Jersey, New York). These categories were specified by the United 
States Census Bureau’s Geography Division (2010; see Figure 16 in the Appendix for a map of 
these regions, taken from the United States Census Bureau). See Table 34 in the Appendix for a 
table depicting the frequency of respondents from each state, grouped by region.   
 I found evidence of an implicit stereotype associating intellectual ability with men across 
all regions of the United States: IAT scores were significantly greater than 0 for participants 
from the West (M = 0.21 [0.14, 0.27], p < .001), the Midwest (M = 0.16 [0.10, 0.23], p < .001), 
the South (M = 0.13 [0.09, 0.17], p < .001), and the Northeast (M = 0.17 [0.11, 0.24], p < .001). 
See Figures 17 and 18 in the Appendix for visual representations of these data. I also submitted 
these data to a regression with gender (men, women), block order (stereotype-congruent-first, 
stereotype-incongruent-first), geographical region (West, Midwest, South, Northeast), and all 
interaction terms predicting IAT scores (see Table 35 in the Appendix). Bonferroni-adjusted 
follow-up tests did not reveal any significant differences in IAT scores between different regions 
of the United States. These results show that the tendency to associate intellectual ability with 
men over women is robust and generalizable.  
Chapter 6 Summary 
 The results of the two supplemental analyses reported in Chapter 6 further illustrate the 
pervasiveness of gender stereotypes about intellectual ability. Specifically, I found positive 
average IAT scores (which indicate that people associate intelligence-related descriptors with 
men over women) that are consistent regardless of undergraduate student major or geographical 




CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The present work marks the first direct, systematic test of children’s and adults’ implicit 
perceptions of the relative intellectual abilities of men versus women. The findings across six 
studies (total N = 1,675) suggest that there exists a pervasive “brilliance = men” implicit 
stereotype that takes root early in development and persists throughout the lifespan. In Study 1, I 
provided initial evidence that such a “brilliance = men” implicit stereotype exists, and that this 
stereotype is found consistently across a variety of samples (e.g., undergraduate students in the 
Midwest, undergraduate students in New York City, and general population adults recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). In Study 2, I replicated these effects across the same three samples 
but with a new control category (“Happy”) to ensure that a “Male + Genius” association is 
driving the effects. In Study 3, I collected a sample of participants from 70 different countries 
and showed that the “brilliance = men” stereotype extends beyond the United States. In Study 4, 
I showed that this stereotype arises early on in development among children growing up in two 
distinct regions of the US, and is similar in magnitude as in adulthood. Finally, in Studies 5 and 6 
I showed that the stereotype might not be exclusive to high levels of intellectual giftedness; 
rather, people may associate men over women with a range of intellectual abilities. In two 
supplemental analyses, I also showed that these associations are robust and generalizable: 
Associations between intellectual ability and men were consistent across undergraduate majors 
and geographical region of the United States. The wide prevalence of this stereotype is 
discouraging, especially because men and women have been shown empirically to have equal 
levels of intellectual ability (e.g., Feingold, 1994; Flynn, 2012; Halpern & LaMay, 2000; Hyde, 
2005; Neisser, et al., 1996; Nisbett et al., 2012; Spelke, 2005).  
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 These results have several important implications, both theoretically and practically. 
Theoretically, these results provide direct support for the FAB Hypothesis, which suggests that 
field-level beliefs about the importance of intellectual talent combine with a “brilliance = men” 
stereotype to discourage women’s participation in certain fields. While prior work has 
established the impact of the “brilliance-required” messages on women’s underrepresentation 
(e.g., Bian, Leslie, Murphy, & Cimpian, 2018; Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2017; Storage et al., 2016), 
the present work is the first to provide evidence for the existence of a pervasive “brilliance = 
men” implicit stereotype for both children and adults in the United States, as well as for adults 
beyond the United States.  
In light of the potential impact of the “brilliance = men” stereotype on diversity, how 
might we mitigate its negative effects? One possibility would be to reduce the prevalence of 
fields’ “brilliance-required” messages, which would render the “brilliance = men” stereotype 
irrelevant. In an environment where hard work and determination are prized (rather than innate 
talent), men and women may both feel qualified to excel, regardless of what society might say 
regarding their relative intellectual abilities. More generally, this work highlights the need for 
researchers to focus not only on gender stereotypes about specific cognitive abilities (e.g., math, 
spatial ability), but also on gender stereotypes about intelligence more broadly. By increasing our 
understanding of the development and persistence of the “brilliance = men” stereotype, we may 
be able to better equip ourselves to combat it.   
Finally, this work also suggests several fruitful avenues for future research. In future 
studies, for example, I hope to further investigate the developmental origins of the “brilliance = 
men” stereotype by creating an IAT suited for even younger children. Specifically, I would like 
to investigate developmental trends for implicit gender stereotypes about intelligence for 
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children between the ages of 4 and 7 (since prior work implicates this age range as a critical time 
for the explicit adoption of this stereotype; Bian et al., 2017). It will also be important to 
investigate related stereotypes about brilliance for other races and ethnicities, since the FAB 
Hypothesis suggests that any group negatively stereotyped with respect to their intellectual 
abilities will be at a disadvantage in contexts that are said to require such ability. We can also ask 
the question of whether people think about the relative intelligence of men versus women 
independent of race and ethnicity—or, conversely, whether the meaning of gender depends on 
the target’s race and ethnicity. For example, do people also associate black men—over black 
women—with intellectual giftedness, or would the results look different in this case? Finally, I 
hope to further investigate the mechanisms by which “brilliance-required” messages combine 
with the “brilliance = men” stereotype to produce underrepresentation. I am currently 
investigating whether women faced with these messages may be placed in a state of stereotype 
threat, which may increase anxiety, impair performance, and decrease their persistence in a field. 
Other mechanisms (e.g., sense of belonging, overt discrimination) will undoubtedly be worth 
further investigation as well.  
Overall, the results of the six studies described here demonstrate the existence, and 
describe the developmental trajectory, of a pervasive “brilliance = men” stereotype. As a result, 
they also provide evidence for the FAB Hypothesis, which is proving to be a fruitful explanation 
for field-by-field variability in women’s representation across the academic spectrum. 
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Figure 1. Four sample trials from the IAT task in Study 1. For (a), participants should press “E” 
on the keyboard to sort this man’s face to the left. For (b), participants should press “I” on the 
keyboard to sort this woman’s face to the right. For (c), participants should press “E” on the 
keyboard to sort this word to the left. Finally, (d) illustrates feedback given to participants who 
provide an incorrect response on the IAT. Participants are required to provide the correct answer 








Figure 2. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 1. Means for each gender were calculated 
while adjusting for block order (i.e., holding block order constant), while overall means hold 
constant both block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ 
(Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated 






















Figure 3. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 1. Each 
dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, 
and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw 
means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each sample. Outliers (filled in black) are 
determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles 
and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most 
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 



















Figure 4. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 2. Means for each gender were calculated 
while adjusting for block order (i.e., holding block order constant), while overall means hold 
constant both block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ 
(Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated 






















Figure 5. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 2. Each 
dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, 
and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw 
means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each sample. Outliers (filled in black) are 
determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles 
and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most 
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 



















Figure 6. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 3, split by region. Means for each region 
were calculated while adjusting for block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the 
R package ‘IATScore’ (Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in 





















Figure 7. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 3, split by 
region. Each dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay 
the dot plots, and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) 
and raw means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each group. Outliers (filled in black) 
are determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = 
quartiles and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the 
most extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 






Figure 8. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 4. Means for each gender were calculated 
while adjusting for block order (i.e., holding block order constant), while overall means hold 
constant both block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ 
(Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated 






















Figure 9. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 4. Each 
dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, 
and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw 
means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each sample. Outliers (filled in black) are 
determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles 
and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most 
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 




Figure 10. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 5. Means for each gender were calculated 
while adjusting for block order (i.e., holding block order constant), while overall means hold 
constant both block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ 
(Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated 





Figure 11. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 5. Each 
dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, 
and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw 
means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each sample. Outliers (filled in black) are 
determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles 
and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most 
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 






Figure 12. Mean IAT scores for participants in Study 6. Means for each gender were calculated 
while adjusting for block order (i.e., holding block order constant), while overall means hold 
constant both block order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ 
(Storage, 2017; available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated 





Figure 13. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Study 6. Each 
dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, 
and include information about the medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw 
means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each sample. Outliers (filled in black) are 
determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles 
and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most 
extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each box away from the box. 






Table 1.  
Correlations with explicit post-survey measures in Study 1 (total N across Studies 1a (Turk), 1b (UIUC), and 1c (NYU) = 413). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.18*** –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.13** 0.65*** –      
4. Modern Sexism 0.17*** 0.88*** 0.44*** –     
5. Feminism –0.17*** –0.97*** –0.54*** –0.80*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.10* 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.46*** –0.55*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.01 –0.30*** –0.06 –0.33*** 0.31*** –0.01 –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.05 0.55*** 0.47*** 0.49*** –0.50*** 0.51*** –0.20*** – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.09† 0.42*** 0.26*** 0.40*** –0.40*** 0.28*** –0.12* 0.60*** 





Partial correlations controlling for gender in Study 1.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.11* –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.09† 0.64*** –      
4. Modern Sexism 0.11* 0.87*** 0.42*** –     
5. Feminism –0.10* –0.97*** –0.52*** –0.78*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.07 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.45*** –0.55*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.01 –0.29*** –0.05 –0.32*** 0.30*** 0.005 –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.06 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.52*** –0.55*** 0.52*** –0.21*** – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.08† 0.43*** 0.25*** 0.40*** –0.41*** 0.28*** –0.11* 0.60*** 






Table 3.  
Correlations with explicit post-survey measures in Study 2 (total N across Studies 2a (Turk), 2b (UIUC), and 2c (NYU) = 404).  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.01 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.04 0.65*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.02 0.88*** 0.45*** –     
5. Feminism –0.02 –0.98*** –0.54*** –0.80*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.06 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.47*** –0.55*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.03 –0.12* 0.10* –0.12* 0.15** 0.25*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.14** 0.65*** 0.50*** 0.50*** –0.62*** 0.50*** –0.06 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.12** 0.59*** 0.34*** 0.53*** –0.59*** 0.39*** 0.004 0.63*** 






Partial correlations controlling for gender in Study 2.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.07 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.08† 0.60*** –      
4. Modern Sexism 0.01 0.87*** 0.39*** –     
5. Feminism –0.08 –0.97*** –0.46*** –0.77*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.10† 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.41*** –0.49*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.03 –0.13* 0.11* –0.13* 0.17** 0.26*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.16** 0.66*** 0.48*** 0.55*** –0.62*** 0.48*** –0.06 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.14** 0.60*** 0.32*** 0.51*** –0.60*** 0.37*** 0.004 0.63*** 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 5.  
Correlations with explicit post-survey measures in Study 3 (N = 511). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Implicit Association Test –    
2. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.02 –   
3. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.01 0.71*** –  
4. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.02 0.05 0.28*** – 




Table 6.  
Partial correlations controlling for gender in Study 3 (N = 511). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Implicit Association Test –    
2. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.03 –   
3. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.02 0.71*** –  
4. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.02 0.05 0.28*** – 




Correlations with explicit post-survey measures in Study 5 (N = 119). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.07 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.01 0.67*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.04 0.85*** 0.44*** –     
5. Feminism 0.08 –0.96*** –0.54*** –0.72*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.06 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.53*** –0.61*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.05 –0.20* 0.08 –0.25** 0.22* 0.20* –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism –0.13 0.61*** 0.47*** 0.49*** –0.57*** 0.50*** –0.17† – 
9. Political Conservatism –0.08 0.52*** 0.29*** 0.53*** –0.49*** 0.38*** –0.15† 0.62*** 





Partial correlations controlling for gender in Study 5.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.12 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.03 0.65*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.08 0.83*** 0.41*** –     
5. Feminism 0.13 –0.95*** –0.50*** –0.69*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.10 0.64*** 0.66*** 0.49*** –0.57*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.04 –0.20* 0.09 –0.25** 0.22* 0.22* –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism –0.14 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.50*** –0.60*** 0.51*** –0.17† – 
9. Political Conservatism –0.09 0.52*** 0.27*** 0.52*** –0.48*** 0.36*** –0.15 0.62*** 







Correlations with explicit post-survey measures in Study 6 (N = 125). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.06 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.04 0.53*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.08 0.87*** 0.41*** –     
5. Feminism 0.04 –0.95*** –0.35*** –0.74*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.09 0.46*** 0.60*** 0.51*** –0.30*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.07 –0.30*** 0.06 –0.18* 0.39*** 0.31*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.04 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.42*** –0.35*** 0.34*** –0.06 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.13 0.54*** 0.31*** 0.39*** –0.55*** 0.14 –0.21* 0.60*** 





Partial correlations controlling for gender in Study 6 (N = 125). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.008 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.04 0.45*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.03 0.86*** 0.32*** –     
5. Feminism –0.02 –0.95*** –0.25** –0.70*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.04 0.39*** 0.55*** 0.45*** –0.22* –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.08 –0.32*** 0.08 –0.18* 0.40*** 0.33*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.07 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.41*** –0.33*** 0.32*** –0.05 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.16† 0.54*** 0.28** 0.37*** –0.54*** 0.10 –0.21* 0.59*** 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
Figure 14. Mean IAT scores for undergraduates in Studies 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c, split by field. 
Means for each field were calculated while adjusting for block order, gender, and testing 
location. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ (Storage, 2017; available on 
CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated guidelines set forth by Greenwald 





Figure 15. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Studies 1b, 1c, 
2b, and 2c, split by field. Each dot represents a single participant’s IAT score. Traditional Tukey 
box plots overlay the dot plots, and include information about the medians (represented by a 
solid line in each box) and raw means (represented by a dotted line in each box) of each group. 
Outliers (filled in black) are determined by the following calculations: Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 
1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles and IQR = the interquartile range). That is, whiskers of each box 
plot travel only to the most extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times the length of each 
box away from the box. Everything beyond is considered an outlier. Outliers are included in the 








Figure 17. Mean IAT scores for Mechanical Turk participants in Studies 1a, 2a, 5, and 6, split by 
region of the United States. Means for each region were calculated while adjusting for block 
order and gender. IAT scores were analyzed using the R package ‘IATScore’ (Storage, 2017; 
available on CRAN), which calculates scores in accordance with validated guidelines set forth by 





Figure 18. Dot plots illustrating the spread of data for participants’ IAT scores in Studies 1a, 2a, 
5, and 6, split by region of the United States. Each dot represents a single participant’s IAT 
score. Traditional Tukey box plots overlay the dot plots, and include information about the 
medians (represented by a solid line in each box) and raw means (represented by a dotted line in 
each box) of each group. Outliers (filled in black) are determined by the following calculations: 
Q1 – 1.5*IQR and Q3 + 1.5*IQR (where Q = quartiles and IQR = the interquartile range). That 
is, whiskers of each box plot travel only to the most extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 
times the length of each box away from the box. Everything beyond is considered an outlier. 





Descriptive statistics for the “positivity” and “desirability” of words used in the IATs in Studies 
1 and 2, from a norming study with 47 participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
 Positivity M Positivity SD Desirability M Desirability SD 
Genius 7.28 1.78 7.51 1.78 
Brilliant 7.60 1.58 7.55 1.59 
Super-smart 7.32 1.83 7.49 1.68 
Creative 7.81 1.41 7.81 1.21 
Artistic 7.21 1.55 7.23 1.59 
Super-imaginative 7.19 1.97 7.26 1.58 
Happy 7.72 1.60 7.96 1.41 
Joyful 7.49 1.54 7.47 1.56 







Table 12.  
Scales and items that comprise the composite “Sexism” measure.  
Scale Item 
Old-fashioned Sexism 1. Women are generally not as smart as men. 
Swim et al. (1995) 2. I would be equally comfortable having a woman as a boss as a man.* 
 3. It is more important to encourage boys than to encourage girls to participate in 
athletics. 
 4. Women are just as capable of thinking logically as men.* 
 5. When both parents are employed and their child gets sick at school, the school should 
call the mother rather than the father. 
Modern Sexism 1. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States. 
Swim et al. (1995) 2. Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination.* 
 3. It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television. 
 4. On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally. 
 5. Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for 
achievement.  
 6. It is easy to understand the anger of women’s groups in America.* 
 7. It is easy to understand why women’s groups are still concerned about societal 
limitations of women’s opportunities.* 
 8. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more 




1. Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of 
the United States. 
 2. Access to education is a crucial part of gaining equal rights for women. 
 3. Although women can be good leaders, men make better leaders.* 
 4. A woman should have the same job opportunities as a man. 
 5. Boys and girls should be able to be whatever they want to be provided that they have 
the skills and training the job demands. 
 6. Equality between the sexes is a worthwhile goal. 
 7. Men should respect women more than they currently do. 
 8. Stereotypes of men and women hurt everyone. 
 9. Men and women should be able to freely make choices about their lives without 
being restricted by their gender. 
 10. Childrearing, whether done by men or women, needs to be valued more by society. 
 11. Even though some things have changed, women are still treated unfairly in today’s 
society. 
 12. Women have been treated unfairly on the basis of their gender throughout most of 
human history. 
 13. The achievements of women in history have not been emphasized as much as those 
of men. 
 14. Men have too much influence in American politics compared to women. 
 15. People who complain that pornography treats women like objects are overreacting.* 
 16. Men still don’t take women’s ideas seriously. 
 17. Women are already given equal opportunities with men in all important sectors of 
their lives.* 
 18. Women have fewer choices available to them as compared to men. 
 19. Women in the U.S. are treated as second-class citizens. 
 20. All men receive economic, sexual, and psychological benefits from male 
domination. 
Note. Items with an asterisk were reverse-scored. Participants rated items from each measure on 




Table 13.  
Items in the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement and Brilliance Stereotype Perception scales.  
Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement and Perception Scale Items 
1. One is more likely to find a male with a genius-level IQ than a female with a genius-level 
IQ. 
2. Extreme intellectual brilliance is more common in men than in women. 
3. On average, men tend to have higher intellectual capacities than women. 
4. Even though it’s not true of everyone, males are generally born with greater raw intelligence 
than females. 
5. The reason why there are few female philosophers is that women tend to think more 
practically. 
6. Men and women have complementary cognitive skills: Men are better at understanding 
objects and mechanical systems, whereas women are better at understanding people and their 
emotions. 
7. Even though it may not be politically correct to say it, males and females might be naturally 
suited for different kinds of intellectual activities.  
8. Males’ and females’ biology has an effect on their cognitive abilities (even though the 
differences might be small).  
Note. Participants rated items on a scale of 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly agree”), first 
according to their own opinion (the Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement scale) and next to the 

































Table 14.  
Items in the Right-wing Authoritarianism scale. 
Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale Items 
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy 
the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.* 
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in 
people’s minds.  
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every 
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.* 
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas. 
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.* 
7. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this 
upsets many people.* 
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at 
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else.* 
10. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting 
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.*  
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”* 
14. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it 
is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
15. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
16. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.* 
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities 
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
18. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.* 
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values.”* 
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up 
and accept their group’s traditional place in society.  
Note. Items with an asterisk were reverse-scored. Participants rated items on a scale of 1 






Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
1. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 25.30 <.001 
Block Order 1 23.61 <.001 
Testing Location 2 3.79 .024 
Gender × Block Order 1 6.26 .013 
Gender × Testing Location  2 0.35 .703 
Block Order × Testing Location 2 6.06 .003 
Gender × Block Order × Testing Location 2 0.95 .387 
Denominator 401   
Note. Total N = 413.  
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Table 16.  
Correlations in Study 1 for men only (total N across Studies 1a (Turk), 1b (UIUC), and 1c (NYU) = 157). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –               
2. Sexism (composite) 0.14† –             
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.08 0.64*** –           
4. Modern Sexism 0.15† 0.87*** 0.35*** –         
5. Feminism –0.13† –0.98*** –0.55*** –0.81*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.11 0.61*** 0.72*** 0.38*** –0.57*** –      
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.11 –0.23*** 0.04 –0.32*** 0.23*** 0.14†  –   
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.24*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.47*** –0.55*** 0.55*** –0.09  – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.17* 0.47*** 0.29*** 0.43*** –0.46*** 0.33*** –0.10 0.56*** 






Correlations in Study 1 for women only (total N across Studies 1a (Turk), 1b (UIUC), and 1c (NYU) = 256). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –               
2. Sexism (composite) 0.08 –             
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.11† 0.64*** –           
4. Modern Sexism 0.08 0.87*** 0.48*** –         
5. Feminism –0.08 –0.96*** –0.50*** –0.75*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.04 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.52*** –0.54*** –      
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.07 –0.33*** –0.12* –0.33*** 0.34*** –0.10†  –   
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism –0.05 0.61*** 0.44*** 0.57*** –0.55*** 0.50*** –0.28***  – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.02 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.38*** –0.38*** 0.23*** –0.12* 0.63*** 






Table 18.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
2.  
 df F p 
Gender 1 4.05 .045 
Block Order 1 49.72 <.001 
Testing Location 2 4.48 .012 
Gender × Block Order 1 0.26 .614 
Gender × Testing Location  2 0.21 .814 
Block Order × Testing Location 2 0.35 .706 
Gender × Block Order × Testing Location 2 0.62 .537 
Denominator 392   




Correlations in Study 2 for men only (total N across Studies 2a (Turk), 2b (UIUC), and 2c (NYU) = 140). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.09 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.08 0.64*** –      
4. Modern Sexism 0.05 0.88*** 0.43*** –     
5. Feminism –0.10 –0.97*** –0.51*** –0.80*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.06 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.53*** –0.56*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.05 –0.07 0.17* –0.07 0.12 0.37*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.15† 0.63*** 0.53*** 0.48*** –0.61*** 0.49*** 0.07 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.18* 0.61*** 0.34*** 0.52*** –0.62*** 0.34*** 0.02 0.58*** 






Table 20.  
Correlations in Study 2 for women only (total N across Studies 2a (Turk), 2b (UIUC), and 2c (NYU) = 264). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.05 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.08† 0.55*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.01 0.86*** 0.35*** –     
5. Feminism –0.06 –0.97*** –0.42*** –0.75*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement 0.12* 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.33*** –0.44*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.06 –0.17** 0.07 –0.16** 0.20*** 0.20*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.16** 0.68*** 0.45*** 0.59*** –0.54*** 0.48*** –0.12* – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.12* 0.61*** 0.32*** 0.52*** –0.59*** 0.40*** –0.004 0.65*** 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 21.  
Countries represented in Study 3 and their relative mappings to corresponding regions. 
Region Country 
Canada Canada 
Eastern and Southeastern Asia Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
Eastern Europe Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Ukraine 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Venezuela 
Northern and Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania 
Southern Asia Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Western Asia Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates 
Western Europe Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 






Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
3. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 9.92 .002 
Block Order 1 50.36 <.001 
Region 7 2.87 .006 
Gender × Block Order 1 0.03 .859 
Gender × Region  7 1.76 .093 
Block Order × Region 7 4.21 <.001 
Gender × Block Order × Region 7 4.98 <.001 
Denominator 473   




Table 23.  
Correlations for men only in Study 3 (N = 360). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Implicit Association Test –    
2. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.02 –   
3. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.002 0.71*** –  
4. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.04 0.04 0.30*** – 





Correlations for women only in Study 3 (N = 151). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Implicit Association Test –    
2. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.07 –   
3. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.06 0.71*** –  
4. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.12 0.06 0.23** – 






Table 25.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
4. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 0.18 .676 
Block Order 1 15.60 <.001 
Testing Location 1 4.03 .048 
Gender × Block Order 1 <0.01 .972 
Gender × Testing Location  1 3.72 .057 
Block Order × Testing Location 1 1.49 .226 
Gender × Block Order × Testing Location 1 1.27 .264 
Denominator 87   




Table 26.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
5. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 1.71 .194 
Block Order 1 2.85 .094 
Gender × Block Order  1 0.64 .424 
Denominator 115   




Correlations for men only in Study 5 (N = 52). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.06 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.03 0.61*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.08 0.77*** 0.34** –     
5. Feminism 0.04 –0.94*** –0.44*** –0.58*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.03 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.50*** –0.48*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception 0.05 –0.29* –0.04 –0.24* 0.30* 0.18 –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.07 0.67*** 0.52*** 0.51*** –0.59*** 0.45*** –0.25† – 
9. Political Conservatism –0.06 0.56*** 0.21 0.64*** –0.52*** 0.38** –0.09 0.62*** 





Correlations for women only in Study 5 (N = 67). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.16 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism –0.04 0.70*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.08 0.87*** 0.47*** –     
5. Feminism 0.20 –0.96*** –0.58*** –0.77*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.15 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.48*** –0.64*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.11 –0.12 0.23† –0.27* 0.15 0.25* –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism –0.26* 0.62*** 0.44*** 0.50*** –0.61*** 0.56*** –0.11 – 
9. Political Conservatism –0.11 0.50*** 0.33** 0.46*** –0.47*** 0.35*** –0.19 0.61*** 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 29.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores in Study 
6. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 3.11 .080 
Block Order 1 7.06 .009 
Gender × Block Order  1 0.14 .713 
Denominator 115   




Correlations for men only in Study 6 (N = 55). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) 0.03 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.01 0.40** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.05 0.81*** 0.29* –     
5. Feminism –0.06 –0.92*** –0.13 –0.60*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.03 0.21 0.55*** 0.37** 0.04 –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.05 –0.29* 0.17 –0.08 0.43*** 0.47*** –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.07 0.39** 0.54*** 0.31* –0.24† 0.19 0.08 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.14 0.53*** 0.21 0.21 –0.60*** –0.20 –0.31* 0.51*** 




Table 31.  
Correlations for women only in Study 6 (N = 70). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Implicit Association Test –        
2. Sexism (composite) –0.01 –       
3. Old-fashioned Sexism 0.07 0.51*** –      
4. Modern Sexism –0.01 0.89*** 0.37** –     
5. Feminism 0.02 –0.97*** –0.38** –0.79*** –    
6. Brilliance Stereotype Endorsement –0.05 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.53*** –0.48*** –   
7. Brilliance Stereotype Perception –0.12 –0.34** –0.04 –0.27* 0.38** 0.18 –  
8. Right-wing Authoritarianism 0.06 0.46*** 0.32** 0.49*** –0.40*** 0.45*** –0.17 – 
9. Political Conservatism 0.18 0.54*** 0.37** 0.51*** –0.50*** 0.42*** –0.10 0.67*** 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 32.  
Majors represented by undergraduates at the University of Illinois and New York University in 
Studies 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c and their relative mappings to corresponding fields.  
Field Major 
Business and Economics Accountancy, Accounting, Advertising, Business, Business 
Administration, Business Managing, Business Marketing, 
Construction Management, Economics, Finance, Human 
Resources, Management, Marketing, Music Business, 
Political Economy, Real Estate, Sports Management 
Psychology Applied Psychology, Clinical Psychology, Cognitive 
Psychology, Cognitive Science, Developmental Psychology, 
Family Studies, General Psychology, Human Development 
and Family Studies, Industrial Organizational Psychology, 
Neurological Psychology, Social Psychology 
Social Sciences and 
Humanities 
Administration, Ancient History, Art, Art History, Cinema 
Studies, Communication, Creative Writing, Drama, English, 
English Literature, Film, Film Production, Fine Arts, History, 
Industrial Design, International Relations, Journalism, Media 
and Communications, Mixed Media, Music Theatre, 
Philosophy, Photography, Political Science, Public 




Actuarial Science, Aerospace Engineering, Animal Science, 
Atmospheric Science, Biochemistry, Biology, Biomedical 
Science, Biomolecular Science, Chemical Engineering, 
Chemistry, Civil Engineering, Computer Science, Dietetics, 
Electrical Engineering, Engineering, Game Design, Geology, 
Global Public Health, Industrial Engineering, Kinesiology, 
Materials Science Engineering, Mathematics, Mechanical 
Engineering, Medicine, Molecular and Cellular Biology, 






Table 33.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting undergraduates’ IAT scores across 
Studies 1b, 1c, 2b, and 2c.  
 df F p 
Gender 1 3.85 .051 
Block Order 1 42.59 <.001 
Testing Location 1 3.14 .077 
Field 3 1.40 .241 
Gender × Block Order 1 7.09 .008 
Gender × Testing Location 1 0.29 .588 
Gender × Field 3 1.78 .150 
Block Order × Testing Location 1 4.97 .026 
Block Order × Field 3 1.09 .355 
Testing Location × Field 3 2.15 .094 
Gender × Block Order × Testing Location  1 0.85 .356 
Gender × Block Order × Field 3 0.14 .937 
Gender × Testing Location × Field 3 0.04 .989 
Block Order × Testing Location × Field 3 1.58 .193 
Gender × Block Order × Testing Location × Field 3 0.71 .548 
Denominator 417   




Table 34.  
Frequency of respondents from each state in Studies 1a, 2a, 5, and 6, grouped by region of the 
United States.  
Region State N 
 
Region State N 
West Alaska 13  South Alabama 6 
 Arizona 2   Arkansas 48 
 California 8   Delaware 43 
 Colorado 8   Florida 21 
 Hawaii 1   Kentucky 7 
 Idaho 1   Louisiana 11 
 Nevada 5   Maryland 13 
 New Mexico 3   Mississippi 2 
 Oregon 5   North Carolina 15 
 Utah 3   Oklahoma 6 
 Washington 9   South Carolina 8 
 Wyoming 1   Tennessee 11 
Midwest Illinois 25   Texas 28 
 Indiana 6   Virginia 12 
 Iowa 5   West Virginia 4 
 Kansas 7  Northeast Connecticut 1 
 Michigan 20   Maine 5 
 Minnesota 13   Massachusetts  6 
 Missouri 8   New Hampshire 3 
 Nebraska 2   New Jersey 18 
 Ohio 20   New York 21 
 South Dakota 3   Pennsylvania 39 
 Wisconsin 6   Rhode Island 2 





Table 35.  
Marginal tests for all coefficients in the regression predicting participants’ IAT scores across 
four regions of the United States represented in Studies 1a, 2a, 5, and 6. 
 df F p 
Gender 1 0.21 .644 
Block Order 1 31.43 <.001 
Region 3 1.55 .202 
Gender × Block Order 1 0.10 .754 
Gender × Region  3 0.71 .549 
Block Order × Region 3 1.16 .324 
Gender × Block Order × Region 3 1.33 .265 
Denominator 490   
Note. Total N = 506.  
 
 
